دانلود رایگان مقاله شبکه R & D در میان تامین کنندگان و تولید کنندگان

Abstract

Empirical evidence documents that R&D networks among vertically related firms are very common. Yet there is currently no formal modeling of such networks. In this paper, we develop a model of R&D networks among manufacturers and their suppliers in order to examine which network architectures emerge in equilibrium, and what their implications are from a welfare viewpoint. Our analysis reveals that private incentives to form R&D networks align with societal ones when vertical relations are non-exclusive, but may conflict when vertical relations are exclusive. In terms of policy, stricter antitrust regulation of exclusive vertical relations may, under certain conditions, be desirable from a social viewpoint.

7. Concluding remarks

This paper provides some of the first insights into the incentives of suppliers and manufacturers to form vertical R & D networks. Building a model of endogenous network formation, we have shown that vertical R & D networks may depend not only on the nature of vertical relations but also on the extent of bi-directional spillover effects arising between manufacturers and their suppliers. More specifically, when vertical relations are non-exclusive, the complete network emerges in equilibrium and maximizes social welfare. When vertical relations are exclusive, however, we find that different network architectures emerge in equilibrium as the spillover differential between manufacturers and their suppliers varies. Yet it appears that only one architecture – the complete network – maximizes welfare. We may conclude that private and social incentives to form R & D networks always align when vertical relations are non-exclusive, but may conflict when vertical relations are exclusive, providing new insights into the stability and efficiency properties of vertical R & D networks. What are the policy implications of these findings? Antitrust law in the U.S. and the E.U. assesses exclusive relations in a relatively lenient way, using in some cases a rule of reason analysis which aims to balance pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects (Federal Trade Commission, 2016; Galarza et al., 2012). In the current setting we have shown that when vertical relations are exclusive, the equilibrium R & D network is ‘under-connected’ if the spillover differential between manufacturers and their suppliers is sufficiently large. Intuitively, when vertical relations are exclusive, there are two competing vertical chains and each supplier charges a specific input price to the corresponding manufacturer. Such input prices serve to relax competition at the upstream market tier, but under certain circumstances they tend to reduce overall welfare. What this implies is that stricter regulation of exclusive vertical relations may be desirable from a social viewpoint if the spillover differential between manufacturers and their suppliers is sufficiently large. By contrast, when vertical relations are non-exclusive, private incentives to form R & D networks are aligned with societal ones, implying that a laissez-faire type of policy might be preferable in that case.