5. Conclusions
Design optimization is an effective strategy to reduce the cost of engineering construction projects. Under the condition of design commission, determining the strategies that will motivate the designer to optimize the project.
This paper focuses on the benefit of design optimization that should be allocated to the designer. Considering the behavior of fairness concerns of the designer and owner, this research established the negotiation model of design optimization profit distribution. We used the negotiation mechanism using a new approach to solve the problem of the designer’s lack of motivation in the engineering design optimization process. Moreover, this study established three types of experimental scenarios. Through simulated negotiation experiments, we further analyzed the effects of the fairness concerns of the designer and the owner on the profit of engineering design optimization and the negotiation performance. Experiment results show the following result. First, the owner should not ignore negotiation with the designer. Second, in the profit distribution process of design optimization, the negotiation feasible region is reduced as the degrees of fairness concerns of the owner and designer increase, and the negotiation cycle enlarges when negotiation is successful under any scenario. When negotiations are successful, in the case wherein only one negotiator has behavior of fairness concerns (Scenarios one and two), with the increase in the degree of fairness concerns, the net income of the negotiator with the behavior of fairness concerns increases; whereas the net income of the other negotiator without the behavior of fairness concerns decreases.