دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی یکپارچگی ارزیابی ریسک ملی در یک سیستم مدیریت ریسک فاجعه - نشریه الزویر

ABSTRACT

The national risk assessment (NRA) has recently become a very important component in a country's disaster risk management (DRM) system. The NRA aims to identify threats and hazards that could affect the entire country, and assess their potential likelihood and impacts from a national perspective. Compared to other DRM activities, NRA work is comparatively new, and is often a response to an external demand. For instance, in the European Union (EU), most member states initiated their NRA process in response to a EU directive. This article investigates how the requirement to conduct a NRA has influenced an existing DRM system, taking the case of Sweden as a study case. Specifically, it examines how the NRA process has been integrated into the multistakeholder, multi-level, bottom-up Swedish DRM system. Empirical data were collected through 21 semistructured interviews with representatives from 13 national authorities, supplemented by Swedish and EU documentation. The results were analyzed following the ISO 31000 risk assessment process. The findings provide an indication of how NRA work has been integrated into ongoing DRM activities, and the level of integration. The results also indicate the extent of stakeholder involvement in the NRA process, the quality of DRM information communication among stakeholders, how the NRA has been implemented in the Swedish context, and the potential to expand the NRA worldwide.

7. Conclusions

This article studied the NRA process from end-to-end. It examined how stakeholders from all levels of society are involved, and how it is integrated into existing DRM activities. It investigated stakeholder involvement, the quality of risk communication, and the level of integration between the NRA process and other DRM activities. The analysis followed the risk management process proposed in ISO 31000. The findings suggested that Swedish NRA work has been integrated with other DRM activities, such as the RVA, the NRCA, and emergency planning cooperation. The results also reveal several problems, notably relating to private stakeholder involvement, mutual and effective risk communication, gray areas in the legislation (particularly the sharing of confidential information), and the fact that the EU's NRA guidelines do not include a capability assessment. Furthermore, the paper has raised some interesting questions about future studies. It should be noted that even though this study focuses on the Swedish NRA and DRM system, the findings are not necessarily limited to Sweden. The project sheds light on the NRA process and provides insights into how to improve NRA practice in any, similar, DRM system.