Abstract
This paper attempts to formalize the effects of liberalization across the border of deposit-taking and lending activities on the regime of competition in the banking market as well as on the rate of growth of the economy. We extend a theoretical model by Deidda (2006) where two economies - Home and Foreign - host at least one operating bank each. The different impacts on such setting of two GATS-defined modes of commercial banking liberalization - namely the Commercial Presence mode and the Cross-Border mode - will then be modeled. Finally, the possibility of strategic behavior by competing banks in equilibrium will also be introduced. The model links in a causal chain the cost structure of the banking industry, the regime of competition in the liberalized banking sector and finally the rate of growth of the economy under alternative modes of liberalization. The model specifically identifies a threshold level of economic development, above which the banking sector would operate competitively, which is sensitive to different modes of commercial banking liberalization. Finally, competitive banking is shown to support an accelerating rate of growth, generating a bidirectional, self-reinforcing link between commercial banking liberalization and growth. The pace of growth is further increased, with respect to a scenario where such behavior is not present, by the presence of strategic behavior by competing banks in equilibrium. Policy-wise the paper suggests to look at the relationship between macroeconomic fundamentals and the cost structure of commercial banking activity rather than claiming that liberalization is growth-enhancing per se.