دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی محافظه کاری مدیریتی، استقلال هیئت مدیره و نوآوری شرکت ها - الزویر 2018

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عنوان فارسی

محافظه کاری مدیریتی، استقلال هیئت مدیره و نوآوری شرکت ها

عنوان انگلیسی

Managerial conservatism, board independence and corporate innovation

صفحات مقاله فارسی

0

صفحات مقاله انگلیسی

44

سال انتشار

2018

نشریه

الزویر - Elsevier

فرمت مقاله انگلیسی

PDF

نوع مقاله

ISI

نوع نگارش

مقالات پژوهشی (تحقیقاتی)

رفرنس

دارد

پایگاه

اسکوپوس

کد محصول

E10684

رشته های مرتبط با این مقاله

مدیریت

گرایش های مرتبط با این مقاله

مدیریت اجرایی، مدیریت کسب و کار

مجله

مجله امور مالی شرکت - Journal of Corporate Finance

دانشگاه

Chinese Academy of Finance and Development - Central University of Finance and Economics - China

کلمات کلیدی

نوآوری، استقلال هیئت مدیره، مدیر خارجی، اندوژنی، اختلاف در اختلاف، SOX

doi یا شناسه دیجیتال

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.10.016

برای سفارش ترجمه این مقاله با کیفیت عالی و در کوتاه ترین زمان ممکن توسط مترجمین مجرب سایت ایران عرضه؛ روی دکمه سبز رنگ کلیک نمایید.

۰.۰ (بدون امتیاز)

امتیاز دهید

چکیده

Abstract

Using panel data on U.S. public firms, we document a positive effect of board independence on corporate innovation. This effect is concentrated in firms that are larger in size, in the non-technical industries, facing less product market competition, and using more debt, where managers are more likely to be excessively risk averse. We establish causality of board independence on innovation using a differencein-difference approach that exploits an exogenous shock to board composition, namely, the mandate of a majority of outside directors on company boards by NYSE and NASDAQ in response to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. We further examine incentive compensation as a possible mechanism. We show that firms with more independent boards use more equity-based compensation, especially stock options, to promote managerial risk-taking.

نتیجه گیری

Conclusion

In this paper, we investigate the effect of board independence on firms’ innovation. Following recent studies, we measure innovation as the number of patents and citations, and board independence by the fraction of outside directors. Using a sample of public firms from 1996-2007, we document a positive relationship between board independence and innovation, indicating board independence in general fosters innovation. We address the potential endogeneity of board composition by utilizing an exogenous shock to firm’s board structure caused by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a quasi-natural experiment: in 2003, the NYSE and the NASDAQ issued new listing requirements that mandated a majority of independent directors for all firms listed on the exchanges. Firms previously not compliant with this rule are forced to increase the representation of outside directors, leading to an exogenous increase in board independence. Our empirical framework is a difference-in-difference approach that compares innovative outputs before and after the forced increase in board independence for non-compliant firms, with those that had already had a majority of outside directors in place as a control group. This exercise confirms our main results.

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