دانلود رایگان مقاله سیستم کنترل مدیریت برای حمایت از استراتژی پایداری شرکت های بزرگ

Abstract

This paper outlines a management accounting system, based upon cost variance analysis, which supports the pursuit of environmental and traditional financial goals within a decentralized organization. The framework decomposes inefficiencies into two parts. The first consists of what might be considered a natural outcome of pursuing the traditional economic goal of efficiency through cost-minimization, a “waste” variance. The second part consists of sustainability gains that produce societal benefit but may be incongruent with short-term economic goals, a “sustainability” variance. While elimination of waste variances can be encouraged using a traditional performance evaluation and reward structure, elimination of sustainability variances requires re-design of performance evaluation tools and reward structures. We demonstrate that differing production functions across operational units within organizations can impact the relative magnitude of the two variances. The failure to recognize and incorporate these differences can lead to inefficient allocation of resources and/or only partial fulfillment of the strategic environmental goals of the organization

5. Conclusion

Pursuit of a strategy that includes environmental goals requires that the compensation system reward management efforts directed towards those environmental benefits that would not occur as an unintended result of profit maximizing behavior. Our model demonstrates that such a system can be constructed. Reduction or elimination of the “sustainability variance” represents a benefit to society that is achieved at a cost to the short-term profitability of the firm. However, having a proactive environmental strategy can have a positive impact on the long-term profitability of a company (Clarkson, Yue, Richardson, & Vasvari, 2011) in terms of its relationship with various stakeholder groups and the resultant increase in the value of its brand. Some firms have focused on waste reduction to achieve environmental goals, others have instituted shadow prices to account for negative externalities. If progress towards the environmental goals would have been achieved under profit maximizing behavior, then any additional rewards are redundant and the design of the underlying compensation system is deficient. Only incremental environmental benefits need to be rewarded to pursue strategic environmental goals. As demonstrated, firms facing production functions with limited possibilities for input substitution can attain sustainability goals primarily through waste reduction. Imposition of shadow prices in such firms produces little social benefit. By contrast, firms with higher degrees of input substitutability can attain sustainability goals not only through waste reduction, but also through appropriate choice of input mix. Imposition of shadow price in such firms will produce social benefit in addition to that provided by waste reduction. Furthermore, firms with a high degree of input substitutability that rely on decentralized management structures will fail to respond adequately to the imposition of a shadow price. In such cases, use of a system of variances such as that developed in this paper can lead to design of appropriate performance evaluation systems. This paper has presented the design of a single management accounting system capable of supporting both environmental management goals and traditional firm goals.