دانلود رایگان مقاله اثر سیاست بازار کار بر بیکاری هنگام تطبیق استراتژی استخدام

Abstract

Firms conduct interviews to select who to hire. Their recruitment strategies affect not only the hiring rate but also job destruction rate as more interviews increase the chances of finding the right worker for the job; a link mostly overlooked in the literature. I model this recruitment behavior and investigate the effects of labor market policies on unemployment. These policies change the value of hiring the right worker, altering firms' incentives to conduct interviews. Policies further affect job creation and destruction when firms adapt their recruitment strategies. Net effect of a policy on unemployment depends on the magnitude of change in job creation versus destruction. Qualitative analysis reveals that the effect of a policy on unemployment is mostly weakened with the introduction of firms' recruitment behavior to the model. Firing taxes still increase unemployment, albeit at a lower rate. The effect of hiring subsidies on unemployment is even reversed: Unemployment increases with hiring subsidies if firms adapt. Minimum wage and unemployment insurance policies are also analyzed.

6. Concluding remarks

The literature on the theoretical analysis of firms' search behaviors is relatively scarce. To contribute towards this gap, I employ a discrete time infinite horizon model with homogeneous workers and firms and match specific output. The quality of an employment relationship between a firm and a worker (match) can be either good or bad. Good matches produce a higher output, while bad matches are undesirable. The true quality of the match is unknown before the employment relationship starts and it is revealed after the parties observe the output. Unemployed workers apply to all vacancy posts and firms pick the number of workers to conduct interviews with, incurring some cost. An interview reveals the probability of the worker being a good match for the firm. Firms choose the number of interviews to maximize the value of their vacancy and select the worker with the highest probability of the match quality being good among workers interviewed. A firm's choice of interviews depends on the productivity gap between a good and a bad match output, the cost of the interview, the probability of a match in the subsequent periods, the cutoff rule for an acceptable match, as well as the distribution that governs the probability of a match quality being good.