دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی امنیت شغلی، ثبات و بهره روی شغلی - وایلی 2017

We study a two-sided matching market with a set of heterogeneous firms and workers in an environment where jobs are secured by regulation. Without job security Kelso and Crawford have shown that stable outcomes and efficiency prevail when all workers are gross substitutes to each firm. It turns out that by introducing job security, stability and efficiency may still prevail, and even for a significantly broader class of production functions.

4. Concluding remarks

In this work we introduce JS stability as a new solution concept for many-to-one matching markets. This concept is inspired by regulated labor markets where costs for firing employees are prohibitively high. We identify a large and maximal family of production functions that are not guaranteed to admit stable outcomes, yet JS-stable outcomes not only exist for these production functions but in fact support all efficient outcomes. While JS stability does not always guarantee efficiency, it does guarantee at least 50% of the welfare of the first best outcome.

Our results can also shed light on markets with a single seller, many buyers, and multiple goods (combinatorial auctions), where buyers correspond to firms (replacing production functions with valuation functions) and items correspond to workers. The assignment of workers to firms and the salaries of workers in a stable outcome correspond to the assignment of items to buyers and the prices of items in a Walrasian equilibrium. Our notion of job security corresponds to an outcome where buyers do not want additional items on top of the items in their bundle, but may want to discard some of the items in their bundle.