دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی تأثیر مالکیت شرکت، نظارت هیئت مدیره بر عملکرد عملیات ادغام و اکتساب چینی - اشپرینگر 2017

Abstract

In this paper, we employ board monitoring mechanisms and within-firm governance variables to investigate the operating performance of 340 mergers and acquisitions in China over the 2004–2011 period. Our results document a significant deterioration in post-acquisition operating performance of acquiring firms over 12–36 months. We find independent directors, managerial shareholding, ownership concentration have a positive and significant impact on operating performance of acquiring firms. However, the related party transactions exert a negative and significant effect on matched control adjusted ROA. Further analysis of our sub-sample indicates that privately owned enterprises are better monitors compared to the state owned enterprises.

6 Conclusions

This paper employs board monitoring mechanisms and within-firm governance to investigate the operating performance of 340 M&As in China. This paper reports some interesting and significant results. First, we find that ownership concentration has a positive and significant impact on operating performance of Chinese acquiring firms. The results therefore provide support for hypothesis 4. The results suggest that a higher ownership concentration provides incentive and greater power to monitor the actions of the managers efficiently and improve the operating performance of Chinese M&A. Moreover, ownership concentration may be used as a substitute for the absence of strong external governance in countries where investor protection is relatively weak such as China as pointed out by Dharwadkar et al. (2000). Second, we find that independent directors exert a positive and significant influence on operating performance suggesting that the extensive reforms carried out in respect of independent directors in 1993 and reinforced in 2001 with comprehensive guidelines specifying the role of independent directors has improved the monitoring function of independent directors and performance of Chinese firms. The findings that related party transactions are negatively related to operating performance suggest tunneling via related party transactions by controlling shareholders thus rendering support for the findings of Jiang et al. (2010); Qian and Yeung (2015). We therefore conclude that in an environment where the protection for minority shareholders is weak, agency problem between the controlling and minority shareholders appears more severe resulting in the expropriation of firm’s assets for private benefits and poor performance. The study also finds CEO duality not to have statistically significant while managerial shareholding appears to have a mixed impact on operating performance.