دانلود رایگان مقاله حکمرانی و کارآفرینی در شرکت های خانوادگی

Abstract

There remains a good deal of uncertainty as to whether and under which governance conditions family firms, even large, publicly traded ones, are entrepreneurial. We shall argue that agency theory, behavioral agency perspectives, and the resource-based view all posit both positive and negative influences regarding entrepreneurship in family firms, while empirical studies, collectively, are no less ambiguous in their findings. We use each of the above theories to propose various governance distinctions that can reconcile these contradictions and suggest when family firms will be most and least entrepreneurial.

Conclusion

Certainly, each of the approaches to family firms and their entrepreneurial efforts have merit, and often are based on sound arguments and suggestive empirical evidence. It is interesting however that even when we follow the logic of each of these theories, they not only differ a good deal from one another in their expectations for family firm entrepreneurial performance, but more importantly, they each contain within themselves contradictory views in this regard. Our thesis in this paper is that their application very much depends on the fine grained aspects of governance that we have described. In no way are all family firms ‘‘created equal’’. They vary considerably in their governance structures and the emotional and resource advantages and disadvantages posed by those structures. Based on such distinctions, we have attempted to develop some propositions that may help to reconcile the rather different perspectives on the entrepreneurial behavior of family firms. We urge others in the field to ascertain the merit of these propositions by conducting empirical research on different types of family firms.