دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی جست و جوی تعیین کننده های حسابرسی داخلی: شواهدی از ساختار مالکیت - وایلی 2017

عنوان فارسی
جست و جوی تعیین کننده های حسابرسی داخلی: شواهدی از ساختار مالکیت
عنوان انگلیسی
Exploring the determinants of internal audit: Evidence from ownership structure
صفحات مقاله فارسی
0
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
15
سال انتشار
2017
نشریه
وایلی - Wiley
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی
PDF
کد محصول
E6989
رشته های مرتبط با این مقاله
حسابداری
گرایش های مرتبط با این مقاله
حسابرسی
مجله
مجله بین المللی حسابرسی - International Journal of Auditing
دانشگاه
School of Management - University of Tampere - Tampere - Finland
کلمات کلیدی
حاکمیت شرکتی، پراکندگی مالکیت، مالکیت خارجی، حسابرسی داخلی، مالکیت دولتی
چکیده

The internal audit literature suggests that firms can gain significant added value from internal audit in terms of improving governance processes, reducing audit fees, and detecting fraud. Nonetheless, not all firms use internal audit. A growing literature examining the determinants of internal audit has identified a number of different determinants, such as firm size, strong commitment to risk management, existence of an audit committee, and an independent board chair. This paper contributes to the existing literature by examining the effects of ownership structure on the voluntary use of internal audit. The logistic regression model of this study is based on data from 107 firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. It shows that ownership structure is a significant determinant of internal audit. Specifically, the paper shows that foreign ownership, dispersed ownership, and state ownership increase the likelihood of a firm using internal audit.

نتیجه گیری

6 | CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION


The importance of the role of internal audit in good corporate governance is widely recognized. However, despite the potential benefits and suggestions from regulators, less than half of the firms examined seem to have voluntarily used internal audit. We further noted that while there are a few studies that have investigated the determinants of internal audit, the effects of ownership structure on the use of internal audit have remained quite unexplored. This was considered a significant research gap, considering that prior research has indicated that ownership structure tends to shape the behavior of firms (Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Dogan & Smyth, 2002; La Porta et al., 2000; Prevost et al., 2002; Rediker & Seth, 1995). The ownership determinants examined in this study include foreign ownership, state ownership, dispersion of ownership, and the influence of a single powerful shareholder. From a research perspective, five important conclusions can be drawn based on the statistical analyses of this study. First, the ownership structure in general seems to affect the use of internal audit. According to our analysis, three out of four ownership‐related determinants are statistically significant, which indicates that ownership structure is related to the voluntary use of internal audit. The results of this study are in line with prior literature suggesting that ownership structure does affect corporate governance (Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Desender et al., 2013; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Second, as hypothesized, state ownership increases the likelihood that a firm uses internal audit. This finding has a solid theoretical basis, as several prior studies have noted that state ownership is a crucial factor affecting a firm's behavior (Connelly et al., 2010; Ennser‐Jedenastik, 2014; La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Furthermore, prior literature suggests that politicians might have an interest in using internal audit as part of a high‐quality corporate governance system in order to find out whether the funds have been used as intended (Carey et al., 2013). Third, as we hypothesized, our results indicate that the more dispersed the ownership structure is the more likely it is that the firm uses internal audit. The dispersion of ownership was measured by the total number of shareholders. This finding has a solid theoretical basis; it is believed that internal audit might be one solution to guarantee shareholders' interests in firms with dispersed owner bases by reducing the information asymmetry between managers and minor shareholders (Adams, 1994; Carey et al., 2000; Goodwin‐Stewart & Kent, 2006). However, it must be noted that, to the extent to which their interests are aligned, several smaller blockholders might work together and enhance their control, as information asymmetries exist between different groups of owners (Connelly et al., 2010).


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