- مبلغ: ۸۶,۰۰۰ تومان
- مبلغ: ۹۱,۰۰۰ تومان
This article considers the impact of preferential, base-specific taxation on equilibrium revenues. While policy makers have argued that it generates a prisoner’s dilemma result, there is mixed support in the academic literature. Using a more plausible model with asymmetric base elasticities and heterogeneity of both firms and countries, I find that preferential taxation can generate greater revenues if countries exhibit sufficient productivity and/or population asymmetry. It is also less distortionary except in cases where moving costs are fully deductible. Allowing for noncorrelated, crosscountry profits is the key factor as it generates base expansion effects.
In the presence of asymmetric elasticities and profit heterogeneity, this article finds that the preferential regime can be revenue dominant under cases of sufficient asymmetry. Policywise, the model lends support toward the usefulness of bilateral tax treaties. Instead of completely banning preferential policies, countries may consider case-specific agreements. Note that the model can also be applied toward other situations such as the effect of interstate or interprovince firm movement. Moreover, the intuition is not limited solely to a corporate tax setting.
However, there are other relevant factors to consider. For example, the sophisticated behavior of multinationals and the impact of profit shifting are crucial given their prominence in the global market. Although the current model focuses on the behavior of singleton firms and capital, it is possible to incorporate multinationals by interpreting them as being a collection of individual firms. Therefore, each singleton represents a different department, arm, and/or subsidiary within the larger structure.