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دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی تاثیر نوع پیش بینی بر کیفیت پیش بینی مدیریت – نشریه الزویر

عنوان فارسی: تاثیر نوع پیش بینی ها و مشوق های مبتنی بر عملکرد بر کیفیت پیش بینی مدیریت
عنوان انگلیسی: The effects of forecast type and performance-based incentives on the quality of management forecasts
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی : 13 تعداد صفحات ترجمه فارسی : ترجمه نشده
سال انتشار : 2015 نشریه : الزویر - Elsevier
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی : PDF کد محصول : E18
محتوای فایل : PDF حجم فایل : 500 Kb
رشته های مرتبط با این مقاله: حسابداری و مدیریت
گرایش های مرتبط با این مقاله: حسابداری مالی و مدیریت عملکرد
مجله: حسابداری، سازمانها و جامعه
دانشگاه: دانشگاه کرنل، ایالات متحده آمریکا
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چکیده

abstract

Understanding forecasts is important because of their pervasiveness in business decisions such as budgeting, production, and financial reporting. In this study we use an abstract experiment to examine how the preparation of disaggregated forecasts interacts with performance-based incentives to influence the accuracy and optimism of forecasts. We manipulate two factors between subjects at two levels each: forecast type (disaggregated or aggregated) and performance-based incentives (present or absent). Consistent with our predictions, we find that (1) preparing disaggregated forecasts leads to greater improvements in forecast accuracy (compared to preparing aggregated forecasts) in the absence of performance-based incentives than in the presence of performance-based incentives, and (2) preparing disaggregated forecasts leads to greater increases in forecast optimism (compared to preparing aggregated forecasts) in the presence of performance-based incentives than in the absence of performance-based incentives. Our study contributes to our understanding of unintentional biases in the forecasting process. Our results have important practical implications for designers of management control systems who elicit internal forecasts from managers. Finally, our results also have important practical implications for those who either prepare or use external management forecasts.

نتیجه گیری

Conclusion

In this study, we use an abstract experiment to examine how forecast type interacts with performance-based incentives to influence both the accuracy and optimism of management forecasts. We find that: (1) preparing disaggregated forecasts leads to a greater improvement in forecast accuracy (compared to preparing aggregated forecasts) in the absence of performance-based incentives than in the presence of performance-based incentives; and (2) preparing disaggregated forecasts leads to a greater increase in forecast optimism (compared to preparing aggregated forecasts) in the presence of performancebased incentives than in the absence of performance-based incentives. Although our study focuses on the disaggregation of information in managers’ performance forecasts, our results have implications for a wide variety of disclosures prepared by managers. Both textual (e.g., MD&A) and verbal (e.g., conference call) disclosures can vary in the extent to which qualitative and quantitative information is disaggregated. Furthermore, the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB’s) emphasis on disaggregated financial reporting as part of their Financial Statement Presentation Project suggests that disaggregation may play an increasingly important role in mandatory disclosures, in addition to voluntary disclosures. Our study suggests that the quality of these disclosures may vary depending on the extent to which these disclosures are disaggregated and the forecasting approach managers use to arrive at these disclosures. We also expect that, to the extent that analysts work closely with the firms on which they provide forecasts and have incentives to provide optimistic forecasts (Koonce & Mercer, 2005; Libby, Hunton, Tan, & Seybert, 2008), they likely succumb to similar biases to those that we document in this study. Such biases are likely exacerbated when analysts forecast components of earnings before forecasting a bottom-line earnings number