دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی تاثیر پول های برگشتی در تمایل حسابرس برای پیشنهاد اصلاحات و ارزیابی ریسک - اشپرینگر 2018

Abstract

Both the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 include clawback provisions that require executives to pay back incentive compensation earned on fnancial statements that are restated in a subsequent period. Such provisions intend to reduce unethical reporting behavior by executives who otherwise might be more inclined to misstate fnancial statements to boost incentive-based compensation. However, such provisions could promote rather than deter unethical behavior. In particular, Pyzoha (Account Rev 90(6):2515–2536, 2015) fnds that, under certain conditions, executives are less willing to restate fnancial statements in the presence of a clawback policy. Similarly, auditors might also act unethically by being less likely to propose restatements in the presence of clawbacks to avoid upsetting management. To examine this possibility, this study reports the results of three experiments that examine the efect of clawback provisions on auditor judgment. Contrary to expectations, our three experiments, along with supplemental qualitative evidence (surveys and interviews of practicing auditors) consistently indicate that clawbacks do not afect auditors’ propensity to propose restatements. These results suggest that a decrease in the number of restatements in a clawback environment will not be due to auditors acting unethically to appease management. The efects of clawbacks on auditors’ risk assessments, however, are less conclusive. As such, we ofer potential post hoc explanations to guide future research.

Conclusion

Results of our three experiments and qualitative methods indicate that there is not a negative relationship between the presence of clawback provisions and auditors’ likelihood of recommending a restatement upon the discovery of a potential accounting misstatement (i.e., we fnd no efects of clawback policies on auditors’ ethical decision-making). Further, we fnd some, but far from conclusive, evidence that the presence of a clawback may decrease auditors’ risk assessments. Therefore, future research is needed to more fully understand the efects of clawbacks on risk assessment. We fnd the lack of results for auditors’ propensity to restate is due to auditors perceiving greater accountability for proposing restatements when doing so could cause managers to forfeit previously received incentive-based compensation (i.e., in the presence of a clawback). However, another potential feature driving our lack of results is that the decision to propose a restatement may just be too important to be infuenced by a clawback, as the risk to the audit frm is too great to avoid proposing a restatement. Although this is consistent with our qualitative evidence where interviewees stressed strong quality control mechanisms over the restatement process, additional research, particularly regarding the efects of clawbacks on auditor–client negotiations around restatements, is needed before reaching more defnitive conclusions.