دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی آیا هیئت مدیره پس از بحران مالی مدیریت ریسک دار خود رها می کند؟ - الزویر 2018

Abstract

This paper documents that directors exhibit a strong tendency to resign from their riskiest directorships in the period subsequent to the financial crisis of 2007–2008. I also find that, in the post-crisis period, riskier directorships become more costly for directors and that the post-crisis director turnover alters board characteristics at riskier firms. While directors departing from their riskiest directorships are more experienced, hold more boards, and are better connected than other departing directors, no such pattern is observed among replacing directors. Finally, I find that departures from riskiest directorships are associated with lower announcement returns. Overall, my results suggest that, after the crisis, the costs of serving on risky boards have increased to the point of inducing board turnover that results in a non-trivial reshaping of corporate boards.

 Conclusions

This paper examines whether the post-crisis institutional emphasis on risk management affects director turnover. I find that directors exhibit a stronger tendency to depart from their riskiest directorships during the period following the 2007-2008 financial crisis, an empirical pattern that is robust to a battery of tests addressing endogeneity concerns. I also find evidence suggesting that the directors’ personal costs associated with board positions at risky firms increase after the financial crisis. In the post-crisis period (but not in the pre-2009 period), increases in firm volatility are followed by increases in the number of board meetings, frequency of shareholder litigation, and levels of director compensation. Additional tests suggest that departures from riskier firms have reshaped corporate boards since the crisis. Compared to directors at less risky firms and to the pre-2009 period, directors at riskier firms in the post-crisis period are relatively less experienced, less connected, and less well educated. When I analyze board departures, I find that directors departing from their riskiest directorships are more experienced, hold more boards, and are better connected and educated than other departing directors, but no such pattern is observed among replacing directors. In line with the notion that the documented turnover pattern has material consequences, I also find lower stock returns around announcements of departures from directors’ riskiest directorships. Overall, my evidence suggests that, for directors, firm risk has become costly enough to be an important determinant of turnover after the financial crisis. From an institutional perspective, my study sheds light on the economic consequences of the post-crisis emphasis on risk oversight. The results indicate that the post-crisis insistence on risk oversight could have altered directors’ preferences across their directorship portfolio. This change in preferences translates into a turnover pattern that appears to have non-trivial consequences for the affected firms.