دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی طراحی قرارداد های عرضه برای زنجیره تامین پایدار با استفاده از نظریه بازی - الزویر 2018

Abstract

The importance of sustainable operations in supply chains has been widely recognised in practice and the extant literature. In this paper, we study coordination issues of a sustainable supply chain that arise due to simultaneous consideration of greening and corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives undertaken by supply chain agents. We specifically consider the scenario where the supplier is responsible for greening and the buyer is accountable for social responsibility. We analyse our model using two-stage Stackelberg game-theoretic approach where the supplier acts as a Stackelberg leader. In this context, we analyse the decentralised supply chain setting using five different contract types, namely wholesale price, linear two-part tariff (LTT), greening-cost sharing, revenue sharing, and revenue and greening-cost sharing contracts. We demonstrate how optimal greening level, CSR level, retail price and profits of supply chain agents are influenced by different contract types. Our analytical results show that greening and social efforts undertaken by supply chain agents are beneficial for the overall supply chain as long as consumer awareness towards greening and CSR exists. Our results show that channel coordinating mechanisms between supplier and buyer is conducive to improve greening and CSR level. LTT perfectly coordinates the supply chain. Through a numerical example with several key parameters we present the effectiveness of different contracts. The results reveal that as a profit maximising agent the supplier prefers LTT contract and the buyer prefers RGCS contract. This paper extends the understanding of supply chain coordination in the context of sustainability.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, we have designed a sustainable SC model by simultaneously considering greening and CSR efforts of SC agents. Subsequently we have analysed five supply contracts in this setup. To the best of our knowledge, such analytical model is hitherto unreported in the extant literature. Specifically, we have considered a two stage SC, where the upstream supplier is accountable for product greening, a downstream buyer is responsible for CSR activities, and the demand is dependent on both greening and CSR levels. In this context, we have first analysed a centralised SC setup for establishing the benchmark solution. Subsequently, we have analysed three classical contracts: WP, LTT, and RS. Then, we have further analysed two sustainability specific contracts: GCS and RGCS. We have presented the analytical results for all these contracts. We obtained the optimal contract parameter(s), order quantity, retail price, greening level, CSR level, supplier’s profit, and buyer’s profit. We have also numerically compared the optimal decisions for these supply contracts.