دانلود رایگان مقاله برنامه پاسخ به تقاضا در بازار برق عمده فروشی سنگاپور

abstract

Singapore is going to implement a demand response (DR) program to further enhance the efficiency and competitiveness of its electricity market. This paper aims to provide an in-depth investigation of this DR program which features demand side bidding and incentive payments. First, the current market clearing model (MCM) of Singapore’s existing wholesale market, which has no demand side bidding, is introduced. A mathematical model of the MCM is formulated to explain and solve the current market clearing process, where the energy and ancillary services are settled simultaneously through a form of auction pricing. Second, the mechanism of how the demand side bidding is incorporated into the current MCM is explained, with an emphasis on the demand side offer and the newly introduced constraints. A modified MCM with DR is then formulated. Third,the incentive payment mechanism intended to promote DR participation is elaborated. Numerical analysis is performed to demonstrate how the current MCM and MCM with DR work, as well as how the incentive payment is settled. Various numerical case studies are carried out to discuss the economic benefits from participating in the DR program.

6. Conclusions

This paper provides a comprehensive study of the market clearing process of Singapore’s wholesale market and the DR program being introduced. Both the current MCM and how the new DR program is going to be incorporated into the current MCM are explained in detail and their mathematical models are formulated. The key requirements on reserve and regulation in the market clearing process are elaborated. The new constraints and requirements induced by the new DR program are also discussed. The new DR program only allows the consumers limited flexibility in actively managing their loads in response to the price signals and therefore the benefits of DR may not be maximized. However, considering that this DR is first of its kind in Singapore, such a DR design ensures a smooth transition from the current regulated market to a deregulated market with demand side bidding and hence it is a reasonable compromise. As such, it provides a valuable reference for other electricity markets intending to achieve market deregulation through initiating DR programs.