دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی تقاضا برای کیفیت حسابرسی در شرکت های تازه تاسیس شده در منطقه MENA - الزویر 2017

عنوان فارسی
تقاضا برای کیفیت حسابرسی در شرکت های تازه تاسیس شده در منطقه MENA: نقش حسابرسی داخلی مکانیسم های حاکمیتی شرکتی
عنوان انگلیسی
Demand for audit quality in newly privatized firms in MENA region: Role of internal corporate governance mechanisms audit
صفحات مقاله فارسی
0
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
34
سال انتشار
2017
نشریه
الزویر - Elsevier
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی
PDF
نوع مقاله
ISI
نوع نگارش
مقالات پژوهشی (تحقیقاتی)
رفرنس
دارد
پایگاه
اسکوپوس
کد محصول
E9000
رشته های مرتبط با این مقاله
حسابداری
گرایش های مرتبط با این مقاله
حسابرسی
مجله
تحقیق در امور مالی و تجاری بین المللی - Research in International Business and Finance
دانشگاه
Economic Sciences and Management of Tunis - Tunisia
کلمات کلیدی
انتخاب حسابرس؛ خصوصی سازی؛ مکانیسم های حکومتداری داخلی؛ منطقه MENA
doi یا شناسه دیجیتال
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.07.167
چکیده

Abstract:


This paper examines whether post-privatization internal governance mechanisms act in a complementary or substitutable fashion in determining auditor choice of newly privatized firms in the Middle East and North Africa region. We find that foreign ownership and board size are positively related to appointing a BigN auditor, while government ownership, board independence and CEO duality show a negative correlation. Moreover, we find that the effectiveness of the board of directors acts as a substitute to the effectiveness of ownership structure in choosing a BigN auditor. Our results suggest that better governance provide a better financial reporting quality of privatized firms.

بخشی از متن مقاله

4. Empirical Results


4.1 Univariate Results.


We perform univariate tests to investigate the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms on the decision to hire a Big N auditor. Table 3 reports the results of our mean and median comparisons of our regression variables between the Big N and nonBig N sub-samples. As we note, the average of OUTS is significantly higher at the 1% level for the sub-sample of firms with a Big N auditor and suggests that firms with more outside directors are more likely to hire a Big N auditor. We also observe that the average of DUAL is significantly lower at the 1% level for the sub-sample of firms with a Big N auditor. This finding is also consistent with H3 and suggests that firms with CEO duality are less likely to hire a Big N auditor. However, the average of BS is not significantly for the sub-sample of firms with a Big N auditor, failing to provide a support for H1. In summary, our univariate results provide a preliminary evidence for the conjecture that firms that appoint a Big N auditor are characterized by less dual functions and more outside directors present in their board.


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