6. Conclusion
Our study was motivated by the fact that firms in various markets spend significant amounts of money on CSR activities. However, it is not clear from the current literature if that is always profitable for the firm to invest in CSR activities. Therefore we address this fundamental question.
Broadly, there are two main types of CSR activities, company ability relevant (CSR-CA) and company ability irrelevant CSR (CSR-NCA). Consumers' willingness to pay for a firm's product increases when they observe that the firm invests in CSR of either type. But when a firm invests in CSR-CA, doing so helps to improve the firm's new product development and manufacturing capabilities, which in turn increases the consumers' expectation of quality of the firm's new product. On the other hand, CSR-NCA does not influence corporate ability. Unlike CSRNCA, CSR-CA has two conflicting effects on a consumer's utility. While the direct effect (i.e., the extra utility consumers receive from buying a product is produced by a firm that invests in CSR) is positive, indirect effect (i.e., expectancy disconfirmation) is negative due to the increase in consumers' pre-launch expectation.
Further, our analysis demonstrates that both firms should invest in CSR-CA if consumers' appreciation of CSR is high. However, if consumers' appreciation of CSR is low then only one firm should pursue CSR-NCA. If consumers' appreciation of CSR is in the medium range then both firms' optimal CSR strategies would depend on consumers' sensitivity to the evaluative context. If consumers' sensitivity to the evaluative context is high then the firms will be better off pursing asymmetric CSR strategies-i.e., one firm investing in CSR-CA, while the other firm investing in CSR-NCA. On the other hand, if consumers' sensitivity to the evaluative context is low, it will be better if only one firm invests in CSR-CA. Below, we summarize both firms' optimal CSR strategies.