دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی ارزش افشای مسئولیت اجتماعی شرکتی: مسائل اوراق قرضه شرکتی در چین - اشپرینگر 2018

Abstract

We provide the first comprehensive and robust evidence on the relationship between CSR disclosure quality and the costs of corporate bonds in China. We find that firms with high CSR disclosure quality are associated with lower costs of corporate bonds. Our findings are robust to endogeneity issues arising from reverse causality, omitted variable bias, and the interdependencies between price and non-price terms. The negative relationship between CSR disclosure quality and the costs of corporate bonds is stronger in weak corporate governance firms and in firms located in regions with weak institutional environments. We also find that firms’ misconduct significantly mitigates the influence of CSR disclosure quality. In the additional analyses, we provide evidence that CSR disclosure can offer incremental information beyond the credit ratings. Regarding non-price terms, we conclude that firms with higher quality of CSR information are less likely to be subject to collateral terms, but they tend to include more restrictive covenants. Further analyses also show that compared with low-quality or mandatory CSR disclosure firms, bond investors perceive firms with CSR disclosures rated above ‘‘A’’ categories or voluntary CSR disclosure as less likely to cause asymmetric information problems and thus charge lower risk premiums. Overall, this study demonstrates that CSR disclosure quality is an important determinant that affects both price and non-price bond contract terms.

Conclusion

The concept of taking social responsibility is prevalent and accepted by management practices around the globe. Prior studies find that the costs of equity and bank loans decrease with an increase in the quality of CSR disclosure. In this paper, we investigate the influence of CSR information disclosure on the costs of corporate bonds using data of CSR reports disclosed in China. The empirical results show that for firms with a higher quality of CSR information disclosure, their financing costs are lower. The results are generally robust after controlling for the endogeneity of CSR disclosure quality and the interdependencies between price and non-price terms in the bond contract.

In addition, we find that the effect of CSR information quality on bond spreads is not homogeneous. The negative influence of CSR information disclosure on the costs of corporate bonds is stronger for firms that have weak corporate governance and are located in regions with a weak institutional environment. This finding implies substitute effects between CSR information disclosure and corporate governance on the reduction of costs of corporate bonds. Furthermore, compared with non-misconduct firms, misconduct firms experience more information problems, and their information credibility (including CSR information) diminishes sharply. Thus, the negative relation between CSR information disclosure and the costs of corporate bonds is less pronounced in firms that are found to have committed misconduct.