دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی مسئولیت اجتماعی شرکت و انتخاب قیمت نسبت به کمیت - الزویر 2018

Abstract

This paper revisits the classic issue of the comparison between price and quantity competition in the presence of Corporate Social Responsible (CSR) private firms. The results are in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom for profit-seeking firms. In fact, profits can be larger under Cournot (resp. Bertrand) also when products are complements (resp. substitutes). Moreover, if the goods are substitutes, then the dominant strategy for each firm may be the choice of the price contract in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Also the dominant Bertrand strategy equilibrium when the goods are complements may be Pareto-inferior from the firms’ perspective. Finally, the cornerstone belief that Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition may be reversed as well.

Conclusions

This paper has revisited the classic issue of the comparison between price and quantity competition in an industry characterized by the presence of private firms engaged in Corporate Social Responsible (CSR) activities, where, in line with most literature, taking into account the consumer surplus in the market decisions is a proxy of the firms’ CSR activity. The presence of CSR behaviours leads to results which are in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom applying for standard profit-seeking-firms. 12 In fact, firms’ profits can be larger under Cournot (resp. Bertrand) also when products are complements (resp. substitutes). Moreover, if products are substitutes, then the choice of the price contract arises as the dominant strategy for each firm in the subgame perfect Nash equilibria. In addition, the dominant Bertrand strategy equilibrium when the goods are complements may be Pareto-inferior from the firms’ perspective. Finally, the paper has shown that also cornerstone belief that the consumer surplus as well as the overall social welfare under Bertrand competition is always higher than under Cournot competition does not holds. In fact, it has been shown that the consumer surplus can be higher under Cournot in the presence of substitute goods, and noteworthy in the precise parametric space in which firms prefer Bertrand competition. Therefore, when goods are substitutes, there is always conflict of interest between consumers and firms. As regards social welfare, the endogenous selection of the competition mode leads to Pareto-efficient welfare outcomes when goods are complements. However, when goods are substitutes, the endogenous selection of the quantity contract never leads to the most desirable welfare outcome precisely because of the overall conflict of interest between firms and consumers. The current results are based on a set of precise assumptions. As future lines of research, the robustness of these findings is called to checked under different model specifications such as the presence of network externalities, endogenous costs of production, for instance wage negotiated between firms and unions, and the presence of managerial delegation.