دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی افزایش شرکت سهامداران یا ذینفعان در ساختارهای حاکمیت - نشریه امرالد

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between corporate governance structures and stakeholder and shareholder value maximization perspectives in 267 African banks from 2006 to 2011. Design/methodology/approach – The authors used the Prais–Winsten ordinary least squares and random effect regression models to explore this relationship to ensure consistency and efficiency in results. The data for this study were collected from Bankscope. Findings – The results of this study show that corporate governance structures such as CEO duality, nonexecutive members and extreme large board size lead to a reduction in both shareholder and stakeholder value maximization. However, audit independence and board size also promote both shareholder and stakeholder value maximization. Although gender diversity promotes profit maximization, it was not significant in any of the models estimated. The results further suggest that the same corporate governance structures promote and detract shareholder and stakeholder value maximization in Africa although the effect of corporate governance structures was weightier on shareholder value maximization confirming the agency theory. Practical implications – From these findings, bank management must pursue the institution of good corporate governance structures and avoid weak corporate governance structures to promote shareholder and stakeholder value maximization. Also equity holders may have to pay particular attention to corporate governance structures because they benefit the most from the institution of good corporate governance structures. Originality/value – This study explores and compares how corporate governance structures promote shareholder and stakeholder value maximization separately in African banks. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first of such studies.

8. Conclusion and policy recommendations

Improving firm performance and ultimately maximizing shareholder value have remained dominant and core to most financial studies and discussions. Several strategies including good corporate governance have emerged as mechanisms for improving firm performance and ultimately maximizing shareholder value. The discussions on how corporate governance affects firm performance have mostly remained in the domain of shareholder theoretical framework. However, given the less discussed effect of corporate governance in the stakeholder theoretical framework, this study attempts to identify which corporate governance structures promotes or protects stakeholders and shareholders value maximization. To do this, the study represents shareholder value with ROE, while representing stakeholder value with ROA.

From the results, it is evident that the same corporate governance structures affect both shareholder and stakeholder value maximization including bank and macroeconomic factors, such as bank size, diversification, credit risk, management inefficiency and inflation. Board size positively influences bank value maximization to shareholders and stakeholders, whilst the square of board size (signifying extreme increase in board size) and nonexecutive membership are negatively related to shareholder and stakeholder value maximization in Africa. These results suggest that as the square of board size and representation of nonexecutive members increase, diverse ideas and opinions arise leading to board room struggles and prolonged deliberations on matters which slow down decision-making. This reduces both shareholder and stakeholder values. The study identifies that good corporate governance in the form of independent audit committee promotes or protects shareholder and stakeholder value maximization.