دانلود رایگان مقاله ضرورت قرارداد اعتماد نوآوری روابط خریدار عرضه کننده

abstract

Main stream research predominantly views contracts as being sufficient for (i.e., driving) performance. In contrast, necessity-thinking implies that contracts allow performance to exist: if the necessary condition is not in place (at the right level), the desired performance will not occur, irrespective of other drivers of performance. Statements implying necessity are common in supply management research; yet, to date, an appropriate tool for testing such statements has been lacking. This article makes the case for the newly developed Necessary Condition Analysis (NCA) method, and applies it to data on forty-eight buyer-supplier service outsourcing relationships to explore the necessity of contracts for a specific relationship outcome, i.e., supplier-led innovation. Also, the necessity of trust is explored, as contracts are implemented within a broader context that involves social characteristics of relationships. The results show that successful relationships, i.e., relationships that have high levels of innovation (as observed in the top ten percent of the relationships studied) must necessarily have contracts with at least medium levels of contractual detail, as well as the highest levels of trust. In relationships with low levels of innovation (i.e., innovation levels that can be achieved by about half of the relationships), neither of the conditions (i.e., contracts and trust) is necessary. As such, applying NCA results in a fundamentally different understanding of the relationship between innovation, and contracts and trust. The results indicate that managers should first ensure the right levels of these necessary conditions, before giving attention to other factors that (on average) produce innovation.

6. Discussion and conclusion

6.1. Contribution and implications This research has two theoretical implications. First, the Necessary Condition Analysis reveals that, in this dataset, contractual detail, goodwill trust, and competence trust are all necessary for medium to high levels of innovation. More specifically, the results show that different innovation outcomes require organizations to achieve in their relationships different threshold levels of contractual detail, goodwill trust, and competence trust (Table 4). If any of these thresholds is not met, the innovation outcomes achieved will be lower, even if the other thresholds are met or even exceeded. As such, applying NCA to an existing dataset provides a new understanding of the combined roles of contracts and trust as it demonstrates that both conditions are necessary (at different levels) for achieving (different levels of) innovation. This insight advances the body of knowledge that views contracts and trust as factors that on average (but not always) increase innovation. The results may also shed additional light on the issue of diminishing returns from investing in contracts and trust. While Wang et al. (2011) and Bidault and Castello (2010) argue that too much detail or too much trust is not conducive for innovation, the results suggest that meeting the threshold levels is necessary for obtaining high returns, while anything beyond the threshold would be a matter of condition inefficiency. As such, the findings seem to suggest that the diminishing returns identified in prior studies may very well be caused by other (possibly omitted) factors that negatively affect innovation.