- مبلغ: ۸۶,۰۰۰ تومان
- مبلغ: ۹۱,۰۰۰ تومان
This article aims to demonstrate the importance of establishing pro-competition rules in the concession of multiple airports to private companies by describing the recent Brazilian experience. More specifically, it addresses: (i) how the economic literature deals with potential competition among different airports, and how this competition was dealt with in the concession programs of Australia, Mexico and the United Kingdom; and (ii) Brazil's recent experience with airport concessions, where international benchmarking led to cross-ownership restrictions. As a conclusion, this paper defends that governments should design regulatory restrictions that account for the existence of competition among airports. Nevertheless, these restrictions must be carefully planned and designed to achieve their goals.
This paper addresses the design and implementation of airport privatization and concession programs, presenting arguments for establishing cross-ownership restrictions in airport auctions. There is a growing literature defending the importance of airport competition as a driver for investment and better service quality. The rationale behind these measures is clear: different airports that share common control have lower incentives to compete among themselves, as there is no financial loss to the common shareholders if customers (either airlines or passengers) exchange one airport for the other. Moreover, common shareholders are capable of coordinating the actions of different airport operators so as to jointly maximize their profits. For example, if two airports are under common control, shareholders may decide to concentrate investments in only one airport, allowing it to become a hub, instead of duplicating investments to develop two competing hubs