دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی مسئولیت مدیرعامل و کارایی مسئولیت اجتماعی شرکت - الزویر 2018

ABSTRACT

In this study, we examine whether and how CEO tenure affects firms' corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. Using a sample of U.S. firms for the 1999–2013 period, we find that firms' CSR performance is significantly higher in CEOs' early tenure than in their later tenure. We also find that the relationship between CEO tenure and CSR performance is stronger when the board is more independent and CEOs have a longer expected employment period, supporting both the signaling interpretation of the career concern hypothesis and the career horizon hypothesis. Consistent with the trend of increasing awareness of the importance of CSR, we find that the relationship between CEO tenure and CSR performance has become more significant in recent years. Finally, we show that better CSR performance in a CEO's early tenure is associated with a lower CEO turnover probability, suggesting that commitment to CSR during CEOs' early tenure could enable them to mitigate career concerns.

Discussion and conclusion

CEOs' two distinct incentives vary at different stages of their tenure. CEOs have a strong need to signal their ability early in their tenure and a lower signaling need later in their tenure. Similarly, CEOs have strong incentives to undertake more investment early in their tenure, as they can reap the benefits later in their tenure. In this study, we examine whether these two incentives arising from CEOs' tenure affect firms' CSR performance. Using a sample of U.S. firms for the 1999–2013 period, we find that firms' CSR performance is significantly higher in CEOs' early tenure than in their later tenure. We show that this trend is more significant in recent years, as the market has increasingly recognized the importance of CSR for value creation and thus has considered CSR to be a performance evaluation criterion. Further analyses show that the negative association between CEO tenure and CSR performance is more pronounced when CEOs have a longer expected tenure, supporting the career horizon hypothesis. Our results also reveal that CEOs' CSR performance early in their tenure is better in the presence of a more independent board, which is consistent with the signaling interpretation of the career concern hypothesis. Finally, we confirm that engagement in CSR early in their tenure could be an appropriate strategy for CEOs to mitigate career concerns, as we show a negative association between early tenure CSR performance and CEO dismissal probability.