ترجمه مقاله نقش ضروری ارتباطات 6G با چشم انداز صنعت 4.0
- مبلغ: ۸۶,۰۰۰ تومان
ترجمه مقاله پایداری توسعه شهری، تعدیل ساختار صنعتی و کارایی کاربری زمین
- مبلغ: ۹۱,۰۰۰ تومان
Abstract
The current account occupies a central position in international economics and policy debates. Indeed, in G20 policy debates the term “global imbalances” is treated as almost synonymous with “current account imbalances.” Current account imbalances do matter and they can be a problem. But this speech argues that this centrality is not that helpful in understanding how the global economy works, especially in a world of free and huge capital flows. And it may even lead to the wrong policy prescriptions, including not paying sufficient attention to potentially more disruptive financial imbalances. A key reason is that, analytically, the current account is asked to shed light on issues for which it is ill-suited, such as the amount of financing a country gets from, or provides to, others, the direction of that financing (who lends to whom), financial instability and the determination of equilibrium interest rates through the familiar saving-investment approach.
5. Conclusion
To conclude, current accounts have been at the centre of international economics and policy for a very long time. There are, of course, very good reasons for this. Current accounts tell us whether a country is spending more than it is producing. They are followed closely by market participants and can influence their mood changes. They can affect the macroeconomic costs of crises. And they can give rise to dangerous protectionist pressures. In short, in this respect I do agree with Maurice Obstfeld (2012), who gives an affirmative answer to the provocative question that heads up his Richard T Ely Lecture: “Does the current account still matter?” But, more generally, current accounts have been asked to tell us more than they can about several key macroeconomic magnitudes – about the volume and direction of capital flows; about how economic activity is financed; about the role countries play in financial intermediation, lending and borrowing; and about the risks of financial instability and the mechanisms involved. The same is true of their assumed prominent role in the determination of equilibrium interest rates, as recently highlighted in the saving glut hypothesis. In my remarks, I have argued that this ultimately stems from the failure to distinguish with suf- ficient clarity between saving and financing, and hence between net and gross flows, and ultimately to recognise the fundamentally monetary nature of our economies. In turn, this problem is compounded by the tempting tendency to extrapolate reasoning that holds in a two-country world to a multi-country world, where it does not apply.