دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی مقررات حاکمیت شرکتی موثر در عملکرد قوی شرکت بین شرکت های رستوران - الزویر 2018

ABSTRACT

This study defends the view that the adoption of corporate governance provisions should not be seen as a detriment to firms’ financial performance. On the contrary, we contend that some combinations of corporate governance provisions may indeed lead to higher firm performance among U.S. restaurant firms. Using a settheoretic method, such as the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), our findings revealed that there are three configurations of governance provisions that lead to superior financial performance. The presence of poison pills appeared as a core condition in all solutions. Negated analysis indicates that the inappropriate bundling of governance provisions leads to poor firm performance.

6. Implications, limitations, and future extensions

We tried to understand the representative conditions of specific bundles of governance provisions on firm performance through an agency theory lens. The main intuition and perspectives of this theory reveal that the separation of company ownership and control lies at the core of Western corporate governance systems. Agents’ and principals’ interests differ substantially, and agency issues do not exist in the same form under heterogeneous industries due to each industry’s unique operational culture and governance context. Therefore, in the hospitality industry context, our findings indicate that while some specific bundles of provisions can be avoided and/or adopted, specific core conditions (e.g., poison pills) should be institutionalized. Rather than having stewards operate on behalf of shareholders’ interests, restaurant companies need external shareholder monitoring to constitute the equilibrium between reducing the risk of under-maximization of shareholders’ financial interests and exploiting managers’ utility.

Our estimations and results are persuasive, and they better approximate the reality compared to parametric techniques such as regression for restaurant companies. Thus, the conceptualization of our results − explaining the bond between different paths and sets of governance provisions and different levels of firms’ financial performance – has valuable merits and critical relevancy for application by practitioners. The association between a firm’s governance mechanisms and the established bundles of provisions in these mechanisms naturally influences the complex and multifaceted shareholder-management relationship. Thus, contingencies and/or mediators are sometimes needed in the bundle of available provisions. For instance, misalignment of managerial and shareholder interests are most likely to cause adverse selection and moral hazard problems in firms’ governance systems and organization.