دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی مزایای بانکداری رابطه ای: شواهدی از بازارهای اعتباری مصرفی - الزویر 2018

Abstract

Using a unique panel dataset that contains comprehensive information about the relationships between a large bank and its credit card customers, we show that relationship accounts exhibit lower probabilities of default and attrition, and have higher utilization rates, than nonrelationship accounts. Dynamic information about changes in the behavior of a customer’s other accounts at the same bank helps predict the behavior of the credit card account over time. These results imply that relationship banking offers significant potential benefits to banks: Information the lender has at its disposal can be used to mitigate credit risk on the credit card account.

5. Conclusion

This study provides direct evidence of the potential benefits of relationship banking to retail banks. Results indicate that, even controlling for traditional sources of bank information (both public information and private, within-account information) and other variables, credit card account holders with other relationships at a bank tend to have higher utilization rates and lower default and attrition rates. In particular, dynamic information about changes in the behavior of an account holder’s other relationships helps predict the behavior of the credit card account over time. This is consistent with the view that, as one of the potential benefits of relationship banking, relationships can help banks better monitor their loans over time. We show that the observed results are not due to selection or higher perceived default costs. They are, however, consistent with a monitoring explanation: Information the lender has at its disposal on the dynamics of the relationship borrower’s other accounts can be used to mitigate credit risk on the credit card account.

These results imply that relationship information is valuable in a predictive sense, but exactly how banks should use this information requires additional consideration. The optimal use of information and optimal contract design, both from the bank’s point of view and socially, is an important but difficult question that is beyond the scope of this paper. First, banks must consider how consumers and their competitors would respond to use of the information. Second, government policies can restrict the use of certain information, including cross-account information. In addition to considering the benefits of such restrictions, a comprehensive analysis of such policies should also consider the potential efficiency loss from excluding information that is predictive.