دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی رقابت بانکی، مداخله دولتی و تامین مالی بدهی شرکت های کوچک و متوسط - امرالد 2017

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of the government intervention and bank competition on small and medium enterprise (SME) external debt financing in Chinese capital market. Design/methodology/approach – This study uses ordinary least squares with standard errors clustered at the firm level. In addition, the authors use the dynamic system generalized method of moments to address the possible endogeneity issue in the regressions. Findings – Using a sample of 908 firms from 2000 to 2010, the authors found that SMEs are more likely to access bank loans only in regions with higher level of government intervention than median government intervention. Further, the result shows that the government is motivated to help SMEs to obtain more external debt in regions where the level of bank competition is lower than the median bank competition index. Last, the authors found evidence that firms with politically connected CEOs are likely to access bank loans. Research limitations/implications – This paper highlights that government intervention enables the SMEs to secure more bank loans. Second, the authors’ results imply that the government is motivated to help SMEs to obtain more external debt in regions with low level of bank competition. Originality/value – This study contributes to the current literature by revealing that government intervention is the driving force alleviating SMEs’ constraints in accessing external financing. Second, this study finds the evidence to supports the argument that government has a strong motive to help SMEs to secure long-term credits for political purpose (Fan et al., 2012), when the level of bank competition is low (Berger and Udell, 2006).

5. Conclusions

Firth et al. (2009) discover the evidence that state ownership is a significant driver of a firm’s external debt financing. Due to relationship lending (De la Torre et al., 2010), it is probable that SMEs can rely on their connections with state-owned banks to secure bank credits. In this study, we examine whether government intervention allows SMEs to access to bank loans using a panel data set drawn from 908 firms from 2000 to 2010. In our model, we control for an extensive collection of factors that possibly affect the firm’s external debt financing and use the system GMM estimation method to address the endogeneity issue.

Our results exhibit that in regions with a higher level of state intervention, SMEs tend to access more bank loans than non-SMEs. This finding supports the social hypothesis that state-owned banks help the government by allocating financial resources to firms with financing difficulties. Furthermore, this finding supports Sun and Li (2005) argument that when debt contracts do not comply with the legal regime effectively, government intervention could act as a substitute mechanism for the legal regime and decreases the cost of performing the debt contracts. In addition, we find important evidence that the government is more motivated to help SMEs to obtain more external debt in regions with a lower level of bank competition. This finding supports the argument that government has a strong motive to help SMEs to secure long-term credits for political purpose (Fan et al., 2012) when the level of bank competition is low (Berger and Udell, 2006). Last, consistent with Luo and Ying (2014), we observe that firms with politically connected CEOs are likely to access bank loans. This finding may help explain why firms’ financing decisions are not free from government intervention in China.