دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی آناتومی مشارکت دولتی و خصوصی: تعهد در نگهداری و تنظیم پهنای باند Ultrafast - الزویر 2018

ABSTRACT

In recent years, the preference for purely private funding and ownership of telecommunications networks has given way to a ‘new wisdom’ that some form of public funding is now likely necessary if faster and more capacious next generation access (NGA) networks are to be constructed in a timely fashion for the majority of the population. Policy-makers are charged with deciding how that public investment will take place. One approach is via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), where public and private actors collaborate in UFB (Ultrafast Fibre Broadband) investment, construction and operation. However, the body of analysis of PPPs in NGA networks to guide policy-makers is scant. By using the concept of regulatory commitment, the paper compares the experiences gained in a hold-up situation in PPPs in other infrastructures (e.g. roading) with the UFB context. A case study of New Zealand's Ultrafast Fibre Broadband Initiative is used to draw new insights for government purchasers and regulatory agencies. In comparing the different forms of PPPs, the paper shows that UFB PPPs reverse the typical direction of financing and ownership observed in roading PPPs. Financing and asset ownership are separated in UFB PPPs, increasing the potential for misalignment of incentives and the likelihood that the public party can use its legislative powers to alter regulatory settings after the PPP contract is signed, and thereby hold up the private party once existing network assets are sunk. Whilst the government instigating the PPP may not be inclined to act opportunistically, a successive government facing different political priorities does not face the same incentives. To the extent that the private party can anticipate this risk, it should structure the initial agreement to ensure that the public party is penalised if such an event occurs (i.e. an automatic right to favourable renegotiation or payment of compensation). Such terms will discourage opportunism, so that the project benefits from timeconsistent alignment of incentives and objectives.

5. Insights and conclusions

The New Zealand UFBI PPP case study illustrates that there are very clear differences between the ‘classic’ BOOT PPPs observed in roading and UFB PPPs. Government financing of infrastructure part or fully-owned ultimately by the private partner ‘unbundles’ the elements that characteristically confer economic advantages on classic PPPs. Furthermore, the exposure of the private partner's (typically sunk) investments to the vicissitudes of subsequent government actions (e.g. regulatory changes) increases the likelihood that the private party will be subject to ‘hold up’.

This appears to arise from the government's actions as network funder being separated from the actions of the regulator, leading to the potential for conflicts or gaps to appear between the use of contractual undertakings to regulate the partners' activities on the newly-subsidised UFB network and other regulatory activities governed by other means (e.g. legislation). Unless the government as new network funder can credibly commit to restrain the actions of the government (or its agents) as regulator (or the public party is itself strictly subordinated to control by the regulator, as occurs in local and municipal ventures within a wider national context), then the private party is subject to opportunistic hold-up. If no such commitment is forthcoming, then the pre-contractual resolution is for the private party to include explicit terms in the PPP agreement requiring the public party to compensate it if the legislative and/or regulatory terms do change during the life of the project. Only then is it possible for the financing and operational environment incentives controlled by the public party to be aligned with the incentives of the private party whose sunk assets are exposed. Clearly the exact terms will differ depending upon the quantity and type of assets brought to the agreement, and the risks involved.