دانلود رایگان مقاله تأمین مالی جمعی: بهره برداری از جمعیت درست

عنوان فارسی
تأمین مالی جمعی: بهره برداری از جمعیت درست
عنوان انگلیسی
Crowdfunding: Tapping the right crowd
صفحات مقاله فارسی
0
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
25
سال انتشار
2013
نشریه
الزویر - Elsevier
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی
PDF
کد محصول
E2394
رشته های مرتبط با این مقاله
مدیریت و علوم اقتصادی
گرایش های مرتبط با این مقاله
مدیریت کسب و کار
مجله
مجله جسارت کسب و کار - Journal of Business Venturing
دانشگاه
دانشکده مدیریت لوون، دانشگاه کاتولیک لوون، بلژیک
کلمات کلیدی
تأمین مالی جمعی، قبل از سفارش، تقسیم سود
چکیده

ABSTRACT


With crowdfunding, an entrepreneur raises external financing from a large audience (the “crowd”), in which each individual provides a very small amount, instead of soliciting a small group of sophisticated investors. This article compares two forms of crowdfunding: entrepreneurs solicit individuals either to pre-order the product or to advance a fixed amount of money in exchange for a share of future profits (or equity). In either case, we assume that “crowdfunders” enjoy “community benefits” that increase their utility. Using a unified model, we show that the entrepreneur prefers pre-ordering if the initial capital requirement is relatively small compared with market size and prefers profit sharing otherwise. Our conclusions have implications for managerial decisions in the early development stage of firms, when the entrepreneur needs to build a community of individuals with whom he or she must interact. We also offer extensions on the impact of quality uncertainty and information asymmetry

نتیجه گیری

6. Concluding remarks


This article sheds light on managerial implications of crowdfunding practices used for entrepreneurial activities. It stresses the need to build a community that ultimately enjoys additional private benefits from participation to make crowdfunding a viable alternative to investor- or creditor-based funding, such as through banks, business angels, or even venture capital. In setting up the initiative, the entrepreneur potentially faces the following tradeoff. Crowdfunding allows for price discrimination. In the case of pre-ordering, the capacity to optimally implement price discrimination between pre-ordering consumers (the crowdfunders) and other consumers may, however, be constrained by the amount of capital the entrepreneur needs to raise to cover the up-front (fixed) costs. Whenever this amount exceeds some threshold, the distortion in price discrimination becomes excessive, in which case the profitability of the crowdfunding initiative is reduced. For larger amounts, crowdfunding based on profit sharing or equity issuance becomes more worthwhile for the entrepreneur when community benefits are associated with the decision to finance the entrepreneurial project. This is because larger amounts help the entrepreneur induce more individuals to participate in the financing without affecting the fraction of profits he or she needs to give up to obtain financing. Finally, we offer insights into how quality uncertainty and information asymmetry affect this tradeoff.


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