دانلود رایگان مقاله تقسیم بندی بازار محصول و خروجی تبانی در محصولات جایگزین

abstract

We extend the differentiated product model, first developed by Bowley (1924), by relaxing the assumption that each firm produces only one differentiated product. By doing so, we are able to analyze the potential for collusive market segmentation in a two-stage decision framework, first in product space and second in output.We find that when firms cannot coordinate on output, the required discount factor that supports collusive market segmentation is strictly decreasing in product substitutability and is greater than partial output and full collusion. Overall we find that output collusion alone is easier to sustain than collusive product market segmentation.

4. Conclusions

By accounting for a two-stage decision process, we were able to evaluate the impact of the firms’ ability to collusively segment a differentiated product market, an important issue for antitrust agencies. Our first important findings is that under partial collusion, i) collusive product market segmentation is unlikely to occur due to the value of entry, and ii) multiproduct competition (conglomeration) and output collusion is more likely to occur than collusive product market segmentation. Secondly, when firms are able to consider collusion over both product space and output, maintaining market segmentation is more likely to occur as products become closer substitutes. Lastly, if firms are found to have collusively segmented the product market, but not output, the impacts are not as severe as with output collusion. However, output collusion is a natural progression if firms are able to coordinate over product space. Given the output collusive payoffs are the same post market segmentation and multiproduct (conglomeration) market structure, even firms with sufficiently high discount factors to initially segment the market may want to consider the overall ease of collusion. For instance, segmented industries must monitor entry and output competition, as well as consumer perceptions of the differentiability of their products. Though we find output collusion is more likely after market segmentation than not, under more realistic informational assumptions our results suggest collusion may be more likely among multiproduct (conglomerate) firms. For instance, firms need not be concerned about entry, as their rival is already in the market, and need not be concerned about adequately estimating the consumers’ view of the differentiability of their products. Therefore, monitoring costs would more likely be lower in the case of a conglomerate industry. Consequently, periodic distortions in the market, changes in consumer preferences and/or imperfections in monitoring that may lead to competitive disagreements that are more likely overcame if the firms are able to focus on one rather than two product dimensions. In relation to the l