5. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine how PRE and disclosure transparency surrounding PRE influences external monitoring from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Specifically, for firms with PRE, we examine the determinants of receiving a PRE-related comment letter from the SEC. While prior research such as Cassell et al. (2013) has examined the determinants of receiving an SEC comment letter, little research has been conducted on SEC comment letters specifically related to tax disclosures. Kubick et al. (2016) find that firms with greater tax avoidance are more likely to receive an SEC comment letter and that these firms subsequently reduce their levels of tax avoidance. Prior research of Krull (2004) demonstrates that managers use PRE to manage earnings to meet a benchmark. Furthermore, Eiler and Kutcher (2014) find that managers exercise discretion in their disclosure transparency related to the unrecognized deferred tax liability on hypothetical repatriations of PRE. Thus, managers utilize flexibility in their disclosures decisions surrounding PRE to meet earnings benchmarks and reduce transparency