دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی مزایای دریافت کننده و استفاده استراتژیک از تماس های خارجی در بازارهای تلفن همراه - الزویر 2018

عنوان فارسی
مزایای دریافت کننده و استفاده استراتژیک از تماس های خارجی در بازارهای تلفن همراه
عنوان انگلیسی
Receiver benefits and strategic use of call externalities in mobile telephony markets
صفحات مقاله فارسی
0
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
12
سال انتشار
2018
نشریه
الزویر - Elsevier
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی
PDF
نوع مقاله
ISI
نوع نگارش
مقالات پژوهشی (تحقیقاتی)
رفرنس
دارد
پایگاه
اسکوپوس
کد محصول
E10189
رشته های مرتبط با این مقاله
مهندسی فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات
گرایش های مرتبط با این مقاله
مخابرات سیار
مجله
اقتصاد و سیاست اطلاعاتی - Information Economics and Policy
دانشگاه
Department of Economics - University of Warsaw - Poland
کلمات کلیدی
پیامدهای بیرونی صدا، مزایای گیرنده، اثرات شبکه، تلفن همراه، ترجیح بیان شده، آزمایش انتخابی گسسته
doi یا شناسه دیجیتال
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2018.03.003
چکیده

abstract


Recent models of network competition demonstrate the incentives for incumbent firms to reduce receiver benefits in an entrant’s network through excessive off-net pricing. Theoretical reasoning behind the role of call externalities in limiting the market share of smaller networks assumes that receiving a call contributes to consumer utility. This paper tests this critical assumption with stated-preference data elicited from subscribers of mobile telephony in Poland. Our findings show that receiver benefits are a significant driver of mobile operator choice. Thus by reducing the volume of outgoing calls, larger networks can limit customer base growth of smaller rivals. Regulatory options for mitigating this effect are discussed. The size of market share gained by introducing a common off-net markup is low: 1.7–2.8% depending on the market segment. However under symmetric termination rates, an entrant would increase its market share by 6.1–8.5% at the expense of incumbents. In case of Poland, this would shorten the catch-up period from eight to five years.

نتیجه گیری

Summary and conclusions


In this paper we empirically identify the strength of receiver benefits based on the stated preferences of Polish mobile subscribers, elicited from a discrete choice experiment. Under the calling-party-pays principle, receiver benefits become an economic externality. The operator of the call-originating party gains direct control over the size of receiver benefits enjoyed by the subscribers of rival operators. Theoretical models of network competition with call externalities identify an incentive for strategic overpricing of off-net calls to reduce receiver benefits and hence lower the attractiveness of rival networks (Jeon et al., 2004; Hoernig, 2007; Armstrong and Wright, 2009). This strategic incentive grows with the size of a network and hence is particularly relevant for limiting market entry and creating consumer lock-in. Recognizing the direct impact of off-net prices set by incumbents on the number of calls received from their peers, potential subscribers will be less likely to choose small a network. We confirm these predictions empirically.


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