ترجمه مقاله نقش ضروری ارتباطات 6G با چشم انداز صنعت 4.0
- مبلغ: ۸۶,۰۰۰ تومان
ترجمه مقاله پایداری توسعه شهری، تعدیل ساختار صنعتی و کارایی کاربری زمین
- مبلغ: ۹۱,۰۰۰ تومان
abstract
Recent models of network competition demonstrate the incentives for incumbent firms to reduce receiver benefits in an entrant’s network through excessive off-net pricing. Theoretical reasoning behind the role of call externalities in limiting the market share of smaller networks assumes that receiving a call contributes to consumer utility. This paper tests this critical assumption with stated-preference data elicited from subscribers of mobile telephony in Poland. Our findings show that receiver benefits are a significant driver of mobile operator choice. Thus by reducing the volume of outgoing calls, larger networks can limit customer base growth of smaller rivals. Regulatory options for mitigating this effect are discussed. The size of market share gained by introducing a common off-net markup is low: 1.7–2.8% depending on the market segment. However under symmetric termination rates, an entrant would increase its market share by 6.1–8.5% at the expense of incumbents. In case of Poland, this would shorten the catch-up period from eight to five years.
Summary and conclusions
In this paper we empirically identify the strength of receiver benefits based on the stated preferences of Polish mobile subscribers, elicited from a discrete choice experiment. Under the calling-party-pays principle, receiver benefits become an economic externality. The operator of the call-originating party gains direct control over the size of receiver benefits enjoyed by the subscribers of rival operators. Theoretical models of network competition with call externalities identify an incentive for strategic overpricing of off-net calls to reduce receiver benefits and hence lower the attractiveness of rival networks (Jeon et al., 2004; Hoernig, 2007; Armstrong and Wright, 2009). This strategic incentive grows with the size of a network and hence is particularly relevant for limiting market entry and creating consumer lock-in. Recognizing the direct impact of off-net prices set by incumbents on the number of calls received from their peers, potential subscribers will be less likely to choose small a network. We confirm these predictions empirically.