دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی ساختار مالکیت و کیفیت افشا: شواهد از اصلاح پیش بینی های مدیریتی در ژاپن - الزویر 2017

ABSTRACT

We investigate the relationship between ownership structure and quality of disclosure in the case of Japanese firms. Our measure of disclosure quality is denoted by the attitude of firms toward voluntary revisions of management earnings forecasts, which are effectively mandatory in Japan. The results show that firms with high foreign and domestic institutional ownership are more likely to provide management forecasts revisions in a voluntary and timely manner. In contrast, firms with high bank ownership have a greater propensity to withhold material changes in management forecast estimates until the very last moment when they are legally compelled to reveal that information. These findings suggest that active investors are able to induce firms to adopt better disclosure practices, while investors with close business ties and access to firms’ private information appear to restrict the flow of information to other investors.

5. Discussion and conclusion

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between a firm’s ownership structure and the quality of its disclosures. Whereas US studies focus on the propensity to provide management forecasts, we examine the propensity to revise initial forecasts since these forecasts are effectively mandated in Japan. In addition, we investigate whether forecasts revisions are provided in a timely manner as opposed to being released just before the firm’s annual earnings announcement with the aim of avoiding violation of legal requirements. The low litigation costs in Japan make firms more likely to adopt disclosure practices that are best suited to their interests or to those of their controlling shareholders.

Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that institutional investors are associated with better disclosures. More precisely, firms with larger foreign and domestic institutional ownership are more likely to provide frequent voluntary revisions to their forecasts. Furthermore, their forecasts revisions tend to be released in a timely manner. These results suggest that institutional investors are able to induce firms to adopt better disclosure practices or that they prefer to invest in firms that are more transparent. Either way, the better informational environment should help their portfolio allocation and trading decisions. In contrast, we find that banks are associated with less timely revisions. As long-term strategic investors, Japanese banks hold shares in client firms to cement lending relationships. These shares are not intended to be sold. Hence, timely updates hardly present any value for them. Moreover, banks already have access to private information through other channels (e.g., through lending and management interactions with the firm’s executives), which preempts their need to receive public updates in the form of earnings forecasts revisions. While they also hold shares in suppliers to consolidate their extended business relationships and induce greater customization, nonfinancial firms do not appear to significantly alter the disclosure practice of their affiliates.