دانلود رایگان مقاله کارتل سازی ناکافی در اوپک

Abstract

A model of global oil production is applied to study cartelization by OPEC countries. We define a measure for the degree of cooperation, analogous to the market conduct parameter of Cyert et al. (1973), Geroski et al. (1987), Lofaro (1999), and Symeonidis (2000). This parameter is used to assess the incentives of different OPEC members to collude. We find that heterogeneity in OPEC and the supplies of the non-OPEC fringe create strong incentives against collusion. More specifically, OPECŠs supply strategy, although observed to be substantially more restrictive than that of a Cournot-Nash oligopoly, is found to still be more accommodative than that of a perfect cartel. The strategy involves allocating larger than proportionate quotas to smaller and relatively costlier producers, as if to bribe their participation in the cartel. This is in contrast to predictions of the standard cartel model that such producers should be allocated relatively more stringent quotas. Furthermore, we find that cartel collusion is more likely to be sustained for elastic than for inelastic demand. Since global oil demand is well known to be inelastic, this observation provides another structural explanation for why OPEC behavior is inconsistent with that of a perfect cartel. Our study points to multiple headwinds that limit OPECŠs ability to mark up the oil price.

5. Discussion

The question of whether OPEC is a cartel or not has been the subject of several econometric studies. Unfortunately, no consistent answer arises from these exercises. Moreover, of the few numerical simulation studies that have been used to study OPEC, none investigates the likely structure of OPEC at a level of detail that sheds light on individual members incentives to cartelize. In fact, the only study that comes close is that of Griffin and Xiong (1997). The authors’ focus, however, is on OPEC members’ incentive to cheat and not OPEC’s cartelization structure itself. In this paper, we have tried to answer the question of what OPEC’s preferred degree of collusion is, using a tractable empirically calibrated global oil market model. In reality, OPEC behavior is of course influenced by several political and economic uncertainties that can be difficult to incorporate in simulation models such as ours. Nonetheless, this should not prevent us from trying to understand OPEC behavior on the basis of the best available data. Our results overwhelmingly lead us to conclude that OPEC is a cartel that is characterized by imperfect collusion. In the words of Adelman (2002), OPEC is a clumsy cartel or in the words of Smith (2005) a bureaucratic syndicate.