دانلود رایگان مقاله مدل بازی زنجیره تامین سبز و تحلیل تحت قرارداد اشتراک درآمد

Abstract

A revenue-sharing contract can play an important role in coordinating the distribution of benefits among the upstream and downstream members of a green supply chain and improving its overall performance. However, there are few quantitative studies on revenue-sharing contracts in green supply chains. To this end, we first establish a green supply chain game model with two kinds of revenue-sharing contracts, and then compare the results with the common centralized control game model and the decentralized decision game model's results. By comparing the models' results, we can quantitatively analyze the impact of the contracts on the internal membership decision variables and the overall performance of the supply chain. Our study also takes consumer sensitivity towards green products into account to make a better sense of its impacts on the relative variables. Finally, we propose that a revenue-sharing contract can effectively improve the greening level of the products and the overall profitability of the supply chain. In particular, the retailer-led revenue-sharing contract leads to higher greening level compared with the decentralized control condition. In addition, under this case, both the manufacturer and the retailer get higher profits, which is of great significance to green supply chain's establishment and cooperation. In addition, the bargaining revenue sharing contract can make both product's greening level and supply chain's overall profit even higher than that under the retailer-led revenue sharing contract.

5. Conclusion

Based on cooperation among manufacturers and retailers in green supply chains, a retailer-led revenue-sharing contract game model and a bargaining revenue-sharing contract game model are established. We discussed the impact of the two revenue-sharing models on green supply chain’s product greening levels, prices and profits. To better understand the results, we further explored and discussed the impact of consumer sensitivity to green improvements on the above variables. From the results, we can see that revenue-sharing contract can improve the greening level of products, and increase the total profit of manufacturer and supply chain. Thus we draw a conclusion that revenue-sharing contract is an important way to promote the cooperation establishment among green supply chain members. In particular, the retail-led revenue-sharing contract makes the profits of the manufacturer, the retailer, and the supply chain all higher than the profits under the decentralized control condition. It is of great significance to the establishment and cooperation of the green supply chain. As for the bargaining revenue sharing contract, it can make the total profit of the green supply chain more favorable than the retailer-led revenue-sharing contract. However, the retailer's profit is less than that under the decentralized model result. Therefore, taking appropriate measures to make up for the retailer's profit loss is of vital importance to bargaining revenue sharing contract’s successful establishment.