دانلود رایگان مقاله ورود به بازار اوراق قرضه دولتی در طول بحران مالی: سرمایه گذاری نامناسب و هزینه های اطلاعات نامتقارن

عنوان فارسی
ورود به بازار اوراق قرضه دولتی در طول بحران مالی: سرمایه گذاری نامناسب و هزینه های اطلاعات نامتقارن
عنوان انگلیسی
Entering the public bond market during the financial crisis: Underinvestment and asymmetric information costs
صفحات مقاله فارسی
0
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
13
سال انتشار
2017
نشریه
الزویر - Elsevier
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی
PDF
کد محصول
E5106
رشته های مرتبط با این مقاله
علوم اقتصادی
گرایش های مرتبط با این مقاله
اقتصاد پولی و اقتصاد مالی
مجله
تحقیق در امور بین الملل و امور مالی - Research in International Business and Finance
دانشگاه
Birmingham Business School
کلمات کلیدی
شرکت های دولتی و خصوصی، تجزیه و تحلیل Logit و بقا
چکیده

abstract


This paper investigates the impact of underinvestment and asymmetric information cost on the determinants and timing of a firm’s decision to issue its first-time public bond. Using a sample of non-convertible public bonds made by UK public and private companies between 2007 and 2011, the results show that the choice of capital source is strongly affected by the agency conflict. In particular, the agency cost in the form of underinvestment problems delays a firm’s entry to the public bond market. However, the results show that, unlike previous studies, private companies are more likely to enter the public bond market before undertaking their equity IPOs, supporting the pecking order theory under asymmetric information argument. The results also suggest that firms with less information asymmetry and those that establish a track record are more likely to undertake bond IPOs during the crisis, but private companies enter the public bond market earlier than the equity market. These results hold even after controlling for bank relationships and demands for external funds.

نتیجه گیری

5. Conclusions


This paper examines the set of determinants ofthe timing of bond IPOs. In particular,the aim ofthis paper is to investigate the factors that impact on firms’ decisions to issue their first public bonds during the crisis. Using a sample of bond IPOs made between 2007 and 2011 in the UK, I document that agency costs in the form of underinvestment problems decrease the probability of issuing first public bonds. These results prove consistent when I use the Cox Proportional Hazard Model as an additional estimation. I find that both public and private firms delay the time of issuing their first public bonds when they have higher growth opportunities, measured by the ratio of capital expenditure, total investment, and asset growth, supporting the underinvestment problem. However, private companies tend to follow the pecking order theory, and hence issue public bonds prior to become public.


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