دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی یک تحلیل تجربی از سیاست ها و شیوه های مدیریت ریسک ارز شرکت ها - الزویر 2017

Abstract

Using a unique and extremely granular data set of complete currency spot and derivatives positions for 101 large non-financial corporations, we compare the stated currency risk management policies with the actual strategies executed by these companies. Our integrative analysis draws from the three principal sources of information that exist about firms: market prices, financial statements, and what firms say about themselves. We first identify a notable discord between the policies and their practices of firms. We next find that these companies engage in a high degree of currency speculation that seems to be driven by market movements with the results strongest for the heaviest derivatives users. Finally, we show that these companies attempt to time the market even when they are engaged in hedging. We find that the actions of companies differ from their words more often when they have a greater amount of debt, particularly foreign currency debt, and a lower level of managerial ownership. In general, we find that corporate risk management is highly speculative and more often than not disagrees with stated company policies.

6. Conclusions

This study makes a number of contributions to our understanding of corporate financial risk management. It is the first study that has been able to compare what companies say about their risk management policies with what they do. Our analysis not only uses the information in market prices and rates, but it also draws from financial statements, as well as public statements made by the companies. Thus, it provides an integrative analysis of the three primary sources of information we have about firms: market prices, accounting statements, and what the firms themselves say. We find a substantial difference between words and actions. We pursue the reason behind this contradiction and find that firms are actually engaged in pure speculation as well as hedge timing. Our results on the latter are a particularly unique contribution to the literature. We show that instead of a consistent pattern of hedging exchange rate risks, companies put hedges on and off based on market movements. Perhaps this active form of hedging occurs because managers believe they have an informational advantage in the local currency markets. We also find that these effects are stronger for the heaviest derivatives users and when managers have more stock options. Interestingly, we find that firms are less likely to be truthful if they have more leverage, and in particular more foreign currency liabilities, and firms are more truthful when there is a higher degree of managerial ownership. The formal practice of corporate risk management is a young and evolving field. Corporations are certainly talking more and more about risk management. Our evidence suggests, however, that they are doing far less than their words suggest.