دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی تجربه پرتغالی در بازسازی بزرگراه های مشارکت دولتی و خصوصی در طول بحران مالی - اشپرینگر 2017

Abstract

How can governments renegotiate public private partnerships (PPPs) in order to reduce public expenditures? In 2011, in the aftermath of the financial and sovereign debt crisis, Portugal asked for financial assistance from the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (‘‘the Troika’’). Annual payments to PPPs in the highway sector represented one of the major burdens of public finances. Over the last two decades, Portugal used PPPs to close the ‘‘infrastructure gap’’ by building 4000 km of highways. The Troika demanded that the Portuguese government renegotiate these PPPs in order to reduce annual payments by 30%, and to develop a more sustainable model. This paper describes these renegotiations. We also discuss the strategy of these renegotiation, in order to reduce costs focus on the main motivations for the public and private sector to conduct this process. A reduction of 18% on future payments was achieved, by using five main strategies: (1) reduce operational service levels; (2) transfer operational service to the public sector, at a lower marginal cost; (3) increase the period between ‘‘major repairs’’; (4) reduce private sector profitability; and (5) change the risk allocation. We detail each strategy and analyse their respective impact on total cost reductions. This paper should be useful to both academics and practitioners, as it describes a complex renegotiation process that led to gains for both sides and reduced public payments in one of countries that used PPPs most aggressively worldwide.

Conclusions

This paper presents the case of a very unique PPP renegotiation: highway PPP renegotiations in Portugal between 2012 and 2015. Under a financial rescue from the Troika, the Portuguese government was forced to reduce public payments in PPPs. In order for private companies to accept the changes, most of the reductions came from reducing service levels and major repairs. These altered terms had no impact on private firms, as the reduction of revenues was followed by a corresponding reduction in costs. However, there was also a reduction in shareholder profitability (mainly in PPPs with national shareholders, where government capacity to negotiate is higher). This IRR reduction was achieved in part by the private sector accepting that the current IRR level was too high, and that the alternative, namely a sovereign default, would result in the collapse of these projects. But it was also achieved by the private sector receiving liquidity from reserve accounts from PPPs and a reduction in the overall risk of the projects.

This renegotiation proves that when both parties are committed to sustaining current and future relationships, they are prone to negotiating a better agreement, thereby ensuring long-term sustainability and value for both parties. It also showed that PPPs should be renegotiated during the life-time of a 30-year contract, as a way to both respond to changes in the project and to deal with changes in the overall context. External factors such as changing economic conditions or political environments can make the concession characteristics of the original contracts obsolete and require renegotiations.