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ترجمه مقاله نقش ضروری ارتباطات 6G با چشم انداز صنعت 4.0
- مبلغ: ۸۶,۰۰۰ تومان
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ترجمه مقاله پایداری توسعه شهری، تعدیل ساختار صنعتی و کارایی کاربری زمین
- مبلغ: ۹۱,۰۰۰ تومان
ABSTRACT
This is a study of the relationship between context, internal corporate governance and firm performance, looking at the case of Turkey, an exemplar of family capitalism. We found more concentrated ownership, often in the hands of families, led to firms performing better; concentrated ownership means that controlling families bear more of the risks of poor performance. Less predictably, given that the institutional environment is so well attuned to family ownership, we found that mechanisms that accord room for a greater range of voices and interests within and beyond families – larger boards and foreign ownership stakes – seem to also make for positive performance effects. We also noted that increase in cross ownership did not influence market performance, but was negatively associated with accounting performance. Conversely, we found that a higher proportion of family members on boards had no discernable effect on performance. Our findings provide further insights on the relationship between the type of institutions encountered in many emerging markets, internal corporate governance configurations and firm performance.
Discussion and conclusion
This study supplements earlier resource-based and agency accounts in bringing an institutional perspective to bear in understanding the consequences of specific internal CG arrangements within a national setting characterized as family capitalism. We found that ownership concentration directly influenced firm performance. This would reflect the extent to which families may be adept in devising strategies for filling institutional voids (Liu et al., 2012). The study reveals that when ownership is concentrated, often in the hands of key families, this results in firms performing better. This is because systemic benefits may be optimized: A high concentration of ownership incentivizes families to work together in optimizing performance, as there is a smaller proportion of outsiders that will share the costs of failure. At the same time, it provides greater incentives for other actors with links to the dominant family to facilitate the activities of the firm. Within family capitalism, it is precisely such extended family based and associated networks that provide the basis of competitiveness; indeed, the system is skewed in favor of such networks (Fainshmidt et al., 2016). In Turkey, cross ownership often is used as a means of ensuring family control even when the latter has a minority stake (Demirag & Serter, 2003). We found that the performance effects of cross ownership were mixed. This would suggest that any negative effects associated with an ability to offload risks onto other, relatively disempowered shareholders, might be offset with the benefits this may confer. Effectively, this allows dominant families to control a wider number of firms than their capital resources would otherwise suggest. In turn, such firms benefit from access to the kind of family based networks that are crucial to accessing markets and resources in such institutional environments.