دانلود رایگان مقاله مکانیزم های همکاری برای تخصیص اسکله

Abstract

This paper proposes two collaborative mechanisms between container shipping lines and port operators to facilitate port operators to make proper berth allocation decisions. In the first mechanism, assuming no transshipment, a shipping line needs to provide the port operator with the utilities associated with the start operation days of each liner route. The total utilities for all start operation days must be 0. A higher bunker and inventory cost for the shipping line means a lower utility. The port operator compensates the shipping line if its ship is scheduled on a day with negative utility and charges additional fees if the ship is scheduled on a day with positive utility. The second mechanism accounts for the utilities related to the inventory cost of transshipment containers. These two mechanisms ensure that shipping lines have no incentive to overstate or undervalue the utilities. The utilities estimated by shipping lines are much more accurate than those estimated by port operators. Hence, models for the tactical berth allocation problem incorporating the utilities provided by shipping lines lead to more efficient and equitable berth allocation plans. The utilities provided by shipping lines can also guide the decisions on operational berth allocation.

5. Conclusions and future work

This paper has proposed two collaborative mechanisms between container shipping lines and port operators to facilitate port operators to make more efficient and equitable tactical berth allocation decisions. In the first mechanism, a shipping line needs to provide the utilities associated with the start operation days of a week at the port for liner service routes with no transshipment containers, where a higher bunker and inventory cost means a lower utility. The port operator compensates the shipping line if its ship is scheduled on a day with negative utility and charges additional fees if the ship is scheduled on a day with positive utility. The requirement that the sum of the utilities of a week equals 0 ensures that the mechanism is fair to shipping lines and port operators, and ensures that shipping lines have no incentive to overstate or undervalue the utilities. In the second mechanism, a shipping line needs to provide the utilities associated with the difference of the start operation days of two liner routes with transshipment containers, where the utilities are related to the inventory cost of the transshipment containers. It is easy to understand that the utilities estimated by shipping lines should be much more accurate than those estimated by port operators. Moreover, utilities estimated by shipping lines reflect the perceived service quality of the shipping lines. The resulting tactical berth allocation model incorporating the utilities provided by shipping lines under the collaborative mechanisms leads to more efficient and equitable berth allocation plans. The utilities provided by shipping lines can also guide the decisions on the operational berth allocation problems.