دانلود رایگان مقاله اثر قرارداد سرمایه گذاری بر رابطه بی ثباتی سیاسی و مالکیت وابسته

ABSTRACT

We investigate whether the degree to which a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) protects against expropriation (i.e., its “stringency”) influences the international strategy of multinational enterprises (MNEs) as they invest in countries with varying levels of political instability. We draw on institutional logic and insights from political economics to hypothesize that BIT stringency will moderate the established positive relationship between host country political instability and minority ownership. Analysis of a sample of 289 foreign investments made by AEX-listed Dutch MNEs in 34 countries between 2004 and 2013 provides support: a more stringent BIT will encourage the MNE to choose a majority stake as political instability rises. Robustness tests provide further support for our argument. The results have both managerial and policy implications relating to the role that BIT stringency plays in determining MNE strategy.

5. Discussion

While previous scholarship has measured the impact of BITs through their presence
by using the number of these bilateral agreements in a particular time period or a dummy for BIT presence (Desbordes & Vicard, 2009; Elkins et al., 2006; Jandhyala & Weiner, 2014; Neumayer & Spess, 2005; Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, 2011), we break new ground by introducing the construct of BIT stringency
a variable capturing differences in the design of BITs across the world. This is a more nuanced measurement than the simple presence (and count) of BITs and will allow researchers to open up new lines of enquiry into how international investment agreement design influences not only FDI flows, but also MNE strategy. While scholars have raised awareness of divergence in the content of BITs (Berger et al., 2013; Sachs & Sauvant, 2009; Sornarajah, 2004), there has been a notable gap in research into how the design features of these agreements influence MNE strategy. Our study addresses this gap.