دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی انگیزه های ناخوشایند تشویق خدمات مالی و حسابرسی داخلی - امرالد 2018

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to understand why managers, internal auditors and compliance staff (in financial firms specifically and using Malaysia as a concrete example) can want to ignore compliance-related legislation (a law on anticompetitive behaviour in this case). Design/methodology/approach – The authors review, discuss and critique the literature on compliance and institutions in the light of existing data from Malaysia’s financial industry (literally confronting theory with data). Findings – Legislative design can actually encourage managers and their auditors disobey/ignore the law for reasons which previous theories cannot explain. Research limitations/implications – This research does not use the regression techniques in vogue now. The findings, nevertheless, imply that attempts to explain phenomenon in management auditing should start with the laws governing managerial activity. Practical implications – Auditors may use the methods used in this study to assess the extent to which financial services firms’ managers have incentives to comply with laws. Similarly, this research can quantify the extent to which internal auditors in these firms have incentives to find untoward conduct. Social implications – Poorly designed laws affecting managerial auditing derive from pre-existing social relationships, as well as help shape them (as shown using data). Identifying areas of noncompliance may actually signal deeper problems in the way businessmen and lawmakers make and enforce laws requiring compliance and self-assessment. Originality/value – The authors know of no study looking at the economic incentives driving internal auditors’ behaviour – particularly in the area of antitrust. They show how law shapes management and auditors’ incentives, quantify these incentives and show how/why previous research fails to explain these incentives.

Conclusion

None of the theories we looked at during our explicative could help us understand why auditors and/or compliance officials would want to voluntarily break a competition law. Based on the economics of compliance, Malaysian financial institutions (particularly banks) should mostly ignore the Competition Act[46]. The data show that Malaysian banks probably benefit from anticompetitive behaviour – earning about RM15bn in rents even after paying the penalties and fines envisioned in the Act. Political and family connections likely facilitate anticompetitive behaviour in corporate Malaysia – if not in the banking sector specifically (though we have no evidence of specific illegal behaviour). Because the Malaysian Competition Commission will likely lack the resources to investigate and prosecute anticompetitive behaviour in Malaysia’s banking industry – banks’ best response to the Act probably consists of ignoring it. Maximum fines of 10m ringgit and revenue-based penalties capped at 10 per cent of world-wide revenues mean that banks have strong incentives to engage in anticompetitive behaviour and just pay the low fines. Because of such perverse incentives, the best compliance programme for banks in Malaysia likely consists of actions which avoid detection rather than stopping anticompetitive behaviour.