- مبلغ: ۸۶,۰۰۰ تومان
- مبلغ: ۹۱,۰۰۰ تومان
Foreign firms face enormous obstacles in attracting investors and analysts when issuing securities in the United States. We use US-listed Chinese firms as our research sample and find that firms that hire top executives (i.e., Chief Executive Officer [CEO] or Chief Financial Officer [CFO]) with work experience in the US or educational qualifications from the US attract more US institutional investors and analysts. Further, we find that CFOs’ US experience dominates the results. Corroborating our results, we further find that firms with US-experienced CFOs are more likely to hold conference calls and voluntarily issue management forecasts, which suggests that CFOs with a US background are better at communicating with US investors and analysts and acting in alignment with US norms compared with Chinese CFOs. Collectively, our results suggest that hiring a CFO with a US background could facilitate cross-listed foreign firms to lower US investors’ and analysts’ information disadvantage.
We use US-listed Chinese firms as our research sample and find that firms that hire top executives (i.e., CEOs or CFOs) with work experience in the US or educational qualifications from the US attract more analysts and institutional investors. Further, we find that CFOs’ US experience dominates the results. To eliminate the innate ability argument, we control for CFO innate ability by following Giannetti et al. (2014) and the results remain consistent. We use the two-stage Heckman method to eliminate selection bias and the results again remain consistent. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that we cannot totally resolve the firm–executive matching endogeneity problem. As supporting evidence, we find that firms with US-experienced executives tend to hold more conference calls and voluntarily issue more management forecasts. This complements previous studies documenting the effect of information disclosure on analysts’ and institutional investors’ activities by looking beyond the outcomes and identifying the core management drivers. Our results suggest that foreign firms attempt to lower investors’ and analysts’ information disadvantage or psychological distance by hiring top executives with US experience. Our findings provide a deeper understanding of the mechanisms that facilitate US-listed Chinese firms to obtain international capital or resources and the results may be generalizable to other foreign firms cross-listed on US exchanges.