THE WAY FORWARD
With few exceptions, since the revolution, relations between the United States and its Persian Gulf allies, on one side, and Iran, on the other, have been characterized by mutual suspicion and hostility. The conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Yemen today are largely seen as proxy wars between the two sides. Each claims it wants peace and stability, while blaming the other for the escalated regional tension. Since early 2017, the rhetoric has further intensified. In May, Prince Mohammed bin Salman — then Saudi deputy crown prince and minister of defense — threatened to take the fight to Iran: “We are not waiting until there becomes a battle in Saudi Arabia; we will work so that it becomes a battle for them in Iran.”58 Brigadier General Hossein Dehqan, Iran’s defense minister, responded with his own threat: “If the Saudis do anything ignorant, we will leave no area untouched except Mecca and Medina.”59 Within the context of this persistent tension between Washington and its allies and Tehran, Iranian strategists have intensified their asymmetrical defense strategy to confront adversaries with greater military and financial resources. Naval forces, ballistic missiles and cyber capabilities have arguably given the Iranians certain advantages. These capabilities are relatively cheap to acquire and maintain and have the potential to inflict a heavy economic and political price on adversaries. The broad goal is not, we argue, to fight the United States and its regional allies militarily, but rather to weaken the political will to initiate and sustain military operations. While the threat is omnipresent and the Islamic Republic has never shied away from grandstanding, the United States and its regional allies need to take note of Iran’s social dynamism when plotting a more coherent response to the perceived Iranian security threat. First, Iran’s domestic and foreign policies are shaped by both ideological orientation and perceived national interests. The experience with Iran suggests that perceived national interests gradually take hold of the leadership and generally come to shape policies. While regime survival is the core, economic prosperity and power projection also play their part in shaping Iran’s behavior. Iran’s regional policy is not driven by an attempt to promote its Shiite ideology. As Ali Vaez argues, “As a Persian nation among Arabs and Turks, a Shiite state among Sunnis, there are natural barriers to Iran’s reach.”60 Further, evidence suggests that the more enmeshed Iran is in the regional and global systems, the more accommodating and less aggressive it becomes.
