دانلود رایگان مقاله افشای سرمایه فکری و حاکمیت شرکتی

Abstract

Empirical examinations of the links between corporate governance and intellectual capital are underresearched, particularly from the context of emerging economies where corporate governance mechanisms tend to be largely ceremonial due to family dominance. This study aims to address this gap in the intellectual capital disclosure (ICD) literature by undertaking an empirical examination of the relationship between corporate governance and the extent of ICD of Bangladeshi companies. Inter alia, the key findings of this study suggest that there is a non-linear relationship between family ownership and the extent of ICD. This research also found that foreign ownership, board independence, and the presence of audit committees are positively associated with the extent of ICD. Conversely, family duality (i.e., where the positions of CEO and chairperson are occupied by two individuals from the same family) is negatively associated with the extent of ICD.

5. Summary and conclusion

This study investigated the relationship between different corporate governance attributes and ICD in Bangladesh. It noted that the majority of business enterprises in Bangladesh are family-owned organizations and that strong family presences on boards of directors have resulted in the emergence of a culture in which the values of corporate governance mechanisms are not always properly appreciated by management (Al Farooque, Van Zijl, Dunstan, & Karim, 2007). Similar to many other developing countries, Bangladesh has adopted a rational corporate governance model; however, the traditional structure of its corporate sector is likely to impact on the effectiveness of such mechanisms. In these circumstances, it is expected that the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on the extent of ICD in Bangladesh will be different to those in developed economy settings. The results of this study suggests that a significant non-linear relationship exists between family ownership and the extent of ICD and implies that as the percentage of family ownership increases, families become more entrenched and ICD is adversely affected. This result is consistent with previous studies on family ownership (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Notably, in the Mexican context, Hidalgo et al. (2011) found that no significant relationship exists between family ownership and ICD. However, unlike the majority of family-owned organization studies (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Wang, 2006), Hidalgo et al. (2011) did not examine the non-linear specification of family ownership and, thus, failed to capture the alignment and entrenchment effects that relate to agency problems in family-owned companies. By examining the neglected dimension, this study contributes to the stream of literature that examines the relationship between corporate governance and the extent of ICD.