دانلود رایگان مقاله انواع مقررات زیست محیطی و تاثیر ناهمگن در بهره وری "سبز"

عنوان فارسی
انواع مختلف مقررات زیست محیطی و تاثیر ناهمگن در بهره وری
عنوان انگلیسی
Different Types of Environmental Regulations and Heterogeneous Influence on “Green” Productivity: Evidence from China
صفحات مقاله فارسی
0
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
9
سال انتشار
2017
نشریه
الزویر - Elsevier
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی
PDF
کد محصول
E3564
رشته های مرتبط با این مقاله
علوم اقتصادی و محیط زیست
گرایش های مرتبط با این مقاله
اقتصاد زیست محیطی
مجله
اقتصاد محیط زیست - Ecological Economics
دانشگاه
دانشکده مدیریت و اقتصاد، دانشگاه صنعتی دالیان، دالیان، چین
کلمات کلیدی
چین، بهره وری
۰.۰ (بدون امتیاز)
امتیاز دهید
چکیده

Abstract


This paper attempts to examine if the “strong” version of Porter Hypothesis is supported in China by investigating how different regulatory instruments and the relative stringency impact “green” productivity. We use a slacks-based measure (SBM) and Luenberger Productivity Index, accounting for undesirable outputs, to evaluate the industrial “green” productivity growth rates of China's 30 provinces. The estimates imply an unsustainable development model in China with significant regional differences. By employing a panel threshold model and a province-level panel dataset during 2000–2012, empirical results show that both command-and-control and market-based regulation have a non-linear relationship with and can be positively related to “green” productivity but with different constrains on regulation stringency: there are double thresholds with the command-and-control and exists an optimal range of stringency for productivity improvement; while a single threshold has been found with the market-based regulation and its current stringency is reasonable for most of provinces. Moreover, based on China's reality, the productivity effect driven by market-based regulation is much stronger than that of the command-and-control. The mechanism of informal regulation is much more complicated. Consequently, we find evidence to support the “strong” Porter Hypothesis that reasonable stringency of environmental regulations may enhance rather than lower industrial competitiveness.

نتیجه گیری

7. Conclusions and Policy Implications


This study attempts to find out if there will be evidence on the “strong” version of Porter Hypothesis in the case of China by examining whether different types of environmental regulations influence environmental TFP growth heterogeneously and if so, whether there exists an optimal level of stringency given a certain type of regulation. Both the aggregate and the province-level results of ETFP growth rates suggest that China has not been on the path towards “green” growth yet and that there exists significant regional differences. We further conduct an empirical analysis by employing a fixed-effect panel threshold model and a panel dataset of China's 30 provinces during the period 2000–2012, and draw interesting and important findings. On the one hand, the threshold regression results of formal regulations support the “strong” version of Porter Hypothesis that formal regulations can be positively related to industrial environmental TFP growth, but with different constrains on command-and-control and marketbased regulation stringency. Specifically, there are two turning points in the non-linear relationship between the command-and-control regulation and ETFP growth and exists a certain range of stringency to induce optimal incentives. However, all 30 provinces in China have been crossed the optimal range, suggesting the stringency of China's current command-and-control regulation being a little bit harsher than the optimal level. While a single threshold has been found with the marketbased regulation and its current stringency is reasonable for most of the provinces. Moreover, based on China's reality, the stimulation on environmental TFP growth driven by market-based regulation is much stronger than that of the command-and-control. On the other hand, informal regulation plays an important and effective role in motivating ETFP growth, but only in terms of education level, not public complaints, implying that education plays an important role in informal regulation's mechanism of action.


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