دانلود رایگان مقاله تاثیر سود معیار بر درجه صداقت در گزارش های مدیریتی - نشریه الزویر

abstract

This paper provides experimental evidence about how the interaction between a company's earnings and its information system influences the degree of honest reporting by managers in a capital budgeting task. Specifically, the results show that participants overstate cost less when the manager's cost report determines whether the firm earns a gain or loss than when their report does not affect whether the firm earns a profit or loss (i.e., the firm always earns either a profit or loss regardless of the cost report). Further, the results suggest that the impact of the earnings situation on the degree of honesty depends on whether the firm uses an information system that improves its ability to detect misreporting. Specifically, the earnings situation has less effect on the degree of honesty when the firm uses an information system. This is because the information system decreases honesty when the manager's report determines whether the firm earns a profit or loss but increases it otherwise. This study provides important insights into the conditions under which information systems can crowd out prosocial behavior

5. Discussion

This study examines the impact of the company's earnings situation on the degree of honest reporting by managers. The results show that people overstate costs less when the manager's cost report is able to determine whether the company incurs a loss or a gain than when the company always earns a loss or a profit regardless of the manager's cost report. A larger fraction of managers also remain honest or underreport costs to help the company to remain profitable when their reports affect the firm's ability to realize profits. While such behavior has been observed in other studies such as in Evans et al. 2001 (i.e. in particular under the hurdle contract), this paper suggests that this behavior occurs more frequently in companies where managers perceive that misreporting can have more significant repercussions for the company. The study further predicts and finds an interaction of the company's earnings situation and the use of information systems suggesting that the positive effects on firm profits of information systems that help a company to detect suspicious reporting (e.g., Hannan et al., 2006) do not always materialize. Results show that the earnings situation has less effect on the degree of honesty when the firm uses an information system. Information systems tend to reduce misreporting (i.e. reduce larger cost overstatements) in the condition where the company always incurs a loss or a profit, while it increases misreporting when the manager's report can determine whether the firm earns a gains or a loss. Using theories of Mazar et al. (2008), I presume that information systems in the gain/loss condition shift participants' behavior towards dishonest reports that the company cannot detect as suspicious at the expense of reporting behavior that is beneficial for firm profit.