دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی آیا سختگیری در فساد خطر سقوط قیمت سهام را کاهش می دهد؟ - الزویر 2018

عنوان فارسی
آیا سختگیری در فساد خطر سقوط قیمت سهام را کاهش می دهد؟ شواهد از چین
عنوان انگلیسی
Does crackdown on corruption reduce stock price crash risk? Evidence from China
صفحات مقاله فارسی
0
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
46
سال انتشار
2018
نشریه
الزویر - Elsevier
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی
PDF
نوع مقاله
ISI
نوع نگارش
مقالات پژوهشی (تحقیقاتی)
رفرنس
دارد
پایگاه
اسکوپوس
کد محصول
E10689
رشته های مرتبط با این مقاله
اقتصاد
گرایش های مرتبط با این مقاله
اقتصاد مالی، اقتصاد پولی
مجله
مجله امور مالی شرکت - Journal of Corporate Finance
دانشگاه
School of Accountancy - Central University of Finance and Economics - China
کلمات کلیدی
فساد، سختگیری، ریسک سقوط، خطر سیاسی، جمع آوری اخبار بد
doi یا شناسه دیجیتال
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.05.005
۰.۰ (بدون امتیاز)
امتیاز دهید
چکیده

Abstract


This study examines whether crackdown on political corruption in China affects future stock price crashes. Using data from corruption-related prosecutions, we find that firms under prosecuted official jurisdictions experience a significant decrease in crash risk after the crackdown. Crosssectional tests show that results are more pronounced for firms with higher political dependence on governments and for firms with worse information environment. Moreover, channel tests provide direct evidence that crackdown decreases crash risk by reducing political risk and bad news hoarding. Overall, our study offers novel evidence on how crackdown on corruption benefits firms.

نتیجه گیری

Conclusion


This study investigates the impact of corruption crackdown on firm-specific crash risk. Using data of corruption prosecution cases of municipal-level officials in China, we find that firms located in corrupted regions experience a significant decrease in crash risk in the years after the crackdown. Our empirical results suggest that the crackdown on corrupt government officials disrupts political connections and protections, and reduces political risk as well as impairs the ability and incentive of managers to suppress bad news. Consequently, crash risk in the future becomes smaller. Further analyses show that our results are stronger for firms with closer political dependency on local governments and for firms with worse information environment. Finally, using channel tests, we provide direct evidence that crackdown reduces future crash risk by lowering political risk and curbing bad news hoarding. Our empirical results are also robust to a battery of sensitivity checks. To sum up, our evidence suggests that crackdown on political corruption reduces future stock price crash risk and contributes to the stability of the stock market.


بدون دیدگاه